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CORPORATE BEHAVIOR AND THE SOCIAL 
EFFICIENCY OF TORT LAW 
John A. Siliciano* 
Over time, proponents have defended the tort system on a number 
of policy grounds. Traditionally, normative goals such as fairness and 
individualized justice have been advanced as rationales. 1 The emer-
gence during the last half-century of strict liability for defective prod-
ucts also saw the introduction of a number of more instrumental 
justifications: liability rules served to compensate victims, to distribute 
accident costs more widely across society, and to shift the risk of acci-
dents to parties deemed more capable of avoiding such accidents or 
bearing their cost.2 Most recently, these compensatory, risk spreading 
and deterrent rationales have largely coalesced into a unified theory 
that portrays and justifies the tort system as a mechanism for encour-
aging socially optimal choices between risk and safety.3 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1975, Cornell University; M.P.A. 
1979, Princeton University; J.D. 1979, Columbia Law School. - Ed. I wish to thank Gregory 
Alexander, Alfred Aman, Cynthia Farina, George Hay, James Henderson, Sheri Lynn Johnson, 
Reinier Kraakman, Jonathan Macey, Russell Osgood, Dale Oesterle, Stewart Schwab, and Fred 
Zacharias for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
1. See generally A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRU• 
DENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN 
AMERICAN TORT LAW 3.1-3.19, 4.41-4.52 (1984) [hereinafter A.B.A. REPORT]; Fletcher, Fair· 
ness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF 
VALUES 183-206 (1970). 
2. See generally Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intel-
lectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). For interesting com-
mentary on the conflict between normative and instrumental justifications for tort law, sec 
Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J, LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985); Fletcher, 
supra note 1. 
3. Although tort courts and traditional tort scholars have often justified tort rules on the 
ground that they deterred socially undesirable behavior by product manufacturers, see Owen, 
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 703 (1980); A.B.A. 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.122, the actual model of tort law as an instrument for encouraging 
optimal levels of product safety has come from economic-oriented theorists. See, e.g., W. 
LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) [hereinafter Eco-
NOMIC STRUCTURE]; Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J, 
LEGAL STUD. 535, 536 n.3 (1985) [hereinafter Positive Economic Analysis]; Landes & Posner, 
Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J, LEGAL STUD. 417 
(1984) [hereinafter Catastrophic Injuries]; Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of 
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1981) [hereinafter Positive Economic Theory]; Oi, The Economics 
of Product Safety, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1973); Sha veil, Strict Liability versus Neg Ii· 
gence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J, LEGAL 
STUD. 323 (1973). See also Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J, 656 
(1975); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970). 
None of these theorists argue that the tort system is achieving or can expect to achieve a 
1820 
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In essence, this model of tort law posits that producers who might 
otherwise face inadequate incentives to act with care will, if saddled 
through liability rules with the costs of injuries caused by defective 
products, seek to reduce such costs to optimal levels in order to re-
main competitive. They will do so by engaging in safety-related meas-
ures until the costs of further investments in safety exceed the amount 
of liability thereby avoided. At this equilibrium point, the producer 
will be behaving in a socially efficient manner - producing products 
with a cost-effective balance of safety and risk - and will have suc-
cessfully minimized its combined avoidance and liability costs. All 
other factors being equal, such a producer should triumph in the mar-
ketplace over rivals who fail to solve correctly the safety-risk calculus. 
At first glance, this social efficiency vision of the tort system ap-
pears both simple and powerful. Without the cumbersome prodding 
of direct regulation, indeed without any legislative action at all, manu-
facturers are propelled to manufacture products that embody society's 
largely unspoken preferences concerning the optimal mix of safety and 
risk. Even the product-related injuries that occur under this concep-
tion of the tort system take on a more benign character. No longer are 
these injuries the result of heartless indifference to consumer safety on 
the part of careless manufacturers; instead, they represent the inevita-
ble expression of society's wise decision not to spend the extravagant 
resources required to eliminate the last traces of product risk. Such 
injuries may merit compensation, but not regret. 
Indeed, the narcotic effect of the social efficiency model of tort is so 
strong that one easily forgets that it is simply a model, and one that 
has never been empirically tested. 4 Moreover, the conclusion sug-
gested - that competitive product markets in conjunction with tort 
rules naturally encourage optimal investments in safety - would 
probably strike the bulk of the public as preposterous. 5 This pessi-
perfect balance between safety and risk. See, e.g., Positive Economic Analysis, supra, at 535 (sys-
tem is "in the main" efficient but some rules are not); Positive Economic Theory, supra, at 864 
(efficiency is dominant but not sole value of tort law; most tort rules are efficient). This article 
goes much further, however, and questions whether, in light of the impediments to efficiency it 
identifies, there can be any assurance that the product markets actually reflect anything ap-
proaching an optimal level of safety. 
4. Testing of the model may be impossible. See note 9 infra. William Landes and Richard 
Posner, two of the model's proponents, do purport to test the model by presenting data showing 
a positive correlation between the process of urbanization and judicial rejection of the privity 
doctrine. This correlation, it is argued, shows the ability of courts instinctively to move from less 
efficient to more efficient rules as conditions require. Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 
551-53. This article does not contest such a possibility, but instead questions whether the end 
result of such efficiency-enhancing moves will be a system capable of optimizing product safety. 
5. Curiously, in their most recent writing Landes and Posner seemingly disavow any claim 
that tort law actually encourages efficient behavior. Instead, they limit their claim to the thesis 
that most tort rules, when viewed in the abstract, are consistent with an efficient system of laws. 
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mism is echoed by the very actors which the tort system seeks to influ-
ence. 6 Thus, the most comprehensive study of corporate responses to 
tort liability found that the actual operations of the tort system, rather 
than encouraging producers to take optimal care, instead produced 
only an "indistinct signal" largely devoid of useful guidance. 7 
This article examines this dissonance between accepted theory and 
observed reality, between what the model envisions and what the tort 
system seems to deliver. After sketching the model in greater detail, 
the first section of the article reviews restraints within tort law on the 
achievement of efficient outcomes. The analysis then turns to the 
broader legal environment, and describes how legally sanctioned 
means of liability evasion - such as the corporate law8 doctrine of 
limited liability and the bankruptcy rules permitting discharge of obli-
gations - may further undermine the practical utility of the social 
efficiency model of tort. The final section of the article examines tort 
Thus, they note that "(e]ven if tort law does not have a significant effect on behavior, the theory 
advanced ... is not refuted. Ours is a theory of the rules of tort law rather than of the conse-
quences of those rules for behavior." EcONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 3, at 13. See also id. at 
312 ("We argue that the law creates incentives for parties to behave efficiently rather than that 
they actually behave so."). 
This qualification is perplexing, to say the least. If rules are labelled "efficient" based on their 
capacity to encourage parties "to behave efficiently" but in practice they have no effect on behav-
ior, is the label of "efficient" truly warranted? Cannot an opposite rule deserve the same charac-
terization as long as its practical operation does not cause parties to behave any less efficiently? 
Thus, it would seem that before tort law is labelled efficient on the ground that it "creates incen-
tives for parties to behave efficiently,'' the practical capacity of that incentive structure to guide 
behavior must be considered. This article makes such an inquiry, and concludes that the tort 
system, despite its possibly abstract efficiency, confronts serious practical impediments to the 
encouragement of optimal behavior. 
6. Such skepticism has appeared in some scholarly writing as well. See, e.g., Henderson, 
Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 766 (1983) ("That the reality falls far short of the ideal is obvious to anyone 
familiar with the product liability system."); Burrows, Tort and Tautology: The Logic of Restrict-
ing the Scope of Liability, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 414 (1984) ("[S]omething serious is wrong 
with analyses of tort law that make the tort system appear a good deal more successful than 
many observers have long believed to be the case."); Danzon, Comments on Landes and Posner: 
A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 573 (1985) (model 
too simplistic to explain relevant data); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 
658 (1980) ("It is all too easy to show that efficiency leads to desirable results within simplified 
constructs; it is quite another thing to show what this has to do with the world in which we 
live."). 
7. G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO 
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION vii (Rand Institute for Civil Justice Report No. 
R-3022-ICJ, 1983). The Rand study observed the responses of nine manufacturing firms "gener-
ally recognized as leaders in the safety field" to the operations of the tort system. Id. The study 
concluded that tort law, while imposing significant risks on such firms, produced "an extremely 
vague signal" regarding the direction such firms should move to minimize tort exposure. Id. at 
viii. 
8. Despite the fact that dangerous products can be manufactured by noncorporate actors, the 
article focuses primarily on corporate law's impact on the social efficiency model because, as 
noted by Landes and Posner, "defendants in products liability cases are invariably corporations." 
Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 536. 
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reform's potential for overcoming such barriers to efficiency, and, in 
light of its pessimistic conclusion, suggests that rethinking the effi-
ciency norm may be a more appropriate response.9 
I. LIMITS WITHIN TORT LAW ON SOCIAL EFFICIENCY 
A. The Basic Model 
The social efficiency model 10 begins with the assumption that the 
markets for products are reasonably competitive. In such a competi-
tive market, if consumers knew all the risks embodied in various prod-
ucts they purchase, they would factor such risks into their purchasing 
decisions by decreasing the amount they would be willing to pay for a 
product as its riskiness increased. 11 This "informed" demand in turn 
should drive producers, even absent liability rules, toward a socially 
optimal level of safety. 12 In reality, however, few consumers are will-
9. Several words about methodology are in order. First, the article focuses on the products 
liability area, rather than the whole ohort law. Yet, as should become apparent, the concerns it 
raises touch on other areas of law, both within and outside tort, in which similar instrumental 
theories of market-generated efficiency have been advanced. Second, the article addresses the 
social efficiency model on its own terms; it largely relies on generalizations concerning producer 
behavior and market forces, rather than on empirical data, to assess the practical utility of the 
model. Indeed, true empirical testing of tort law's ability to generate efficient outcomes may be 
difficult, if not impossible. Products are introduced and withdrawn from the market continually, 
and withdrawal is often unrelated to safety concerns. Competing products may differ signifi-
cantly in a variety of ways unrelated to safety. Manufacturers may adopt different pricing and 
advertising policies for similar products, and may compete only in portions of their overall prod-
uct markets. Therefore, it may be impossible to identify two competing products that differ only 
with respect to safety in order to determine whether the market favors the product that optimizes 
safety-related costs. See also G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 7, at v ("Data do not exist to 
permit judgment of the reasonableness of the current system. It is not possible to measure the 
improvement, if any, in the level of safety of consumer goods that has resulted in changes in 
regulation and law."). 
10. The model presented here is, to some extent, an amalgamation of the ideas of various tort 
theorists who have focused on the deterrent capacity of tort law, see authorities cited in note 3 
supra, and thus the details of its presentation might not be subscribed to by all. It is, however, 
primarily drawn from the work of William Landes and Richard Posner, for that work most 
directly claims that the products liability system, as it now exists, "is best explained as if the 
judges who created the law ... were trying to promote efficient resource allocation." Positive 
Economic Theory, supra note 3, at 851. See also Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 535 
(tort rules for most part "consistent with efficiency"). Moreover, despite their professed positive 
perspective, Landes and Posner unquestionably proceed upon an implicit normative judgment 
that social efficiency is the proper end of tort law. See, e.g., Posner, The Ethical and Political 
Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). 
11. Indeed, in a perfect market with no information-gathering or transaction costs, consum-
ers theoretically could bargain with producers for levels of product safety that matched their 
specific preferences. See Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 544. 
12. Id. at 540 ("Since consumers will be willing to pay more if expected damages are lower, 
each manufacturer will have an incentive to take care, provided the higher price that consumers 
are willing to offer is enough to offset the cost of taking care."). Thus, if consumers were per-
fectly informed about product risk, the choice of liability rules would not effect the tort system's 
ability to achieve efficient outcomes. A rule of no liability, as well as a rule of absolute liability, 
would simply constitute alternate legal starting points from which producers and their perfectly 
1824 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1820 
ing or able to bear the high costs of fully informing themselves about 
all the relative safety hazards posed by competing products. A pro-
spective car purchaser, for example, might at most purchase a copy of 
Consumer Reports and read its safety analysis of competing car mod-
els. He will not, however, disassemble actual cars looking for hidden 
defects, or commission experts to analyze design features, or attempt 
to quantify remote risks he has succeeded in identifying. Nor will he, 
in any systematic fashion, compare the risks associated with driving to 
the risks of other options, such as walking, taking the bus, or staying 
put. The costs of such investigations - of becoming perfectly in-
formed about product risks - are simply too great in relation to the 
benefits gained for consumers to bear.13 
These informational deficiencies impair the ability of market forces 
to generate optimal levels of safety. 14 Consumers, because they do not 
know or cannot accurately assess all the risks associated with the 
products they consume, may pay more for, or demand greater quanti-
ties of, certain products than they would if acting on perfect informa-
tion. In so doing, they incorrectly signal their preferences for safety 
and risk, and thus unwittingly encourage manufacturers to produce 
excessive risk. 15 Proponents of the social efficiency model of tort ac-
knowledge this potential source of partial market failure, but view lia-
bility rules as an effective corrective mechanism.16 Such rules, 
informed consumers would bargain towards optimal levels of safety. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, 
supra note 3, at 63. 
13. See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 3, at 544. But see Danzon, supra note 6, at 571-
73 (questioning model's assumption that informational barriers are insurmountable); Schwartz & 
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and 
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983) (arguing that only a portion of consumers need to 
be well informed in order to signal consumer preferences correctly). 
14. Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 543-51. In addition to their inability to bear 
the costs of fully informing themselves about product safety risks, consumers as a class may be 
psychologically predisposed - even when acting on reasonably complete information - to sys-
tematically overestimate or underestimate risk, and to make inaccurate comparisons between 
competing risk producing activities. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra 
note 3, at 55-58; ~chwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 763, 776 (1985); Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: 
Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1037 (1980); Slovic, 
Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fear: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIAL RISK ASSESS-
MENT 190 (1980). 
15. The converse, of course, is also true. An uninformed consumer demand may result in the 
production of some goods that are too safe or the consumption of such goods at inappropriate 
levels. From a purely efficiency-oriented view, a deviation in either direction is equally undesir· 
able, since each represents an excessive expenditure of resources. As a practical matter, most tort 
scholarship focuses on the dangers of inadequate investments in safety, perhaps because the con-
sequences of such actions are more easily discerned than are the more subtle and remote effects 
that occur when society budgets too much for safety. In any event, this article also focuses 
primarily on the danger of inadequate safety investment, but does so because of the potential of 
corporate and bankruptcy law skewing resource misallocations in this direction. 
16. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 166 (3d ed. 1986). 
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regardless of their specific nature, generate through liability judgments 
the equivalent of a social consensus concerning the costs of certain 
risks. These costs, when imposed on producers, replicate the incen-
tives to optimize product safety that would exist if consumers were 
fully informed. 
Specifically, the model sensibly postulates that firms seek to mini-
mize the costs of production in order to remain competitive and maxi-
mize profits. Thus, if the costs of accidents caused by defective 
products are imposed through strict liability on a manufacturer, it will 
treat such costs as it does other operating expenses. It will seek to 
reduce such costs to an optimal level by undertaking safety-related 
measures - such as design changes, lower production levels, or better 
consumer education - until the incremental cost of further safety 
measures exceeds the incremental cost of the accident liability that 
might have been avoided through such additional measures.17 Such 
safety-related costs, along with the residual accident costs, will in turn 
be incorporated into the product's price, thus indirectly signalling con-
sumers as to the relative riskiness of the products. 18 Producers with 
inefficiently high accident costs will, if all other production costs are 
equal, be forced to price their products higher than their competitors 
in order to cover such costs. Put simply, the riskier of two otherwise 
identical products will cost more, and thus place its maker at a com-
petitive disadvantage.19 
From a policy perspective, then, the theoretical equilibrium be-
tween safety and risk that the social efficiency model of tort law envi-
sions has much in its favor.20 Accident-related costs are replaced with 
safety-related costs until society, through its impersonal comparative 
pricing of accidents and products, determines that further investment 
in safety is unwarranted. Under strict liability, the remaining accident 
17. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972). In theory, the 
same process of reducing combined accident and avoidance costs to optimal levels will occur 
regardless of whether a rule of negligence or strict liability applies. Henderson, supra note 6, at 
768. The latter regime, however, affects not only the level of care exercised by producers but also 
the level of production of such goods. See Shaven, supra note 3, at 3-4; Positive Economic Analy-
sis, supra note 3, at 541. 
18. Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 556 ("[T]he information about risk is im-
pounded in the higher price and 'communicated' to the consumer in a form that he can under-
stand .... "). 
19. Of course, if the product market were perfectly competitive, and the products' features 
and production costs were truly identical but for their safety component, the riskier product 
would simply not sell because of its higher safety costs. 
20. The social efficiency model is based on traditional utilitarian notions of proper business 
behavior. For a critique of the limits of utilitarian theory in regulating corporate behavior, see 
Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean, If It Were Really to Matter, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 557 (1986). 
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victims, for whom preventive measures would have proved too costly, 
are compensated through liability rules. Perhaps most importantly, 
firms that fail to invest sufficiently in safety are eliminated as excessive 
accident costs render their product prices uncompetitive. 
B. Inevitability and Predictability 
Quite obviously, the ability of firms to make the socially optimal 
tradeoffs between safety and accident costs envisioned by the social 
efficiency model of tort depends heavily on the predictability of such 
costs and the inevitability of their imposition through the tort pro-
cess. 21 If, for example, a safety-related design change will add $3 to 
the cost of a product, but is expected to save $4 per unit by lowering 
otherwise unavoidable tort damages, safety costs should obviously be 
substituted for accident costs. But if a manufacturer by some means 
can avoid paying a portion of accident costs, it may forego preventive 
measures that are appropriate from a tort theory perspective. In other 
words, while society prefers that the manufacturer spend $3 per unit 
for safety to avoid $4 per unit in expected accident costs, such a safety-
enhancing expenditure would be irrational from the firm's perspective 
if its own realized accident liability could be limited to $2 per unit. 
Similarly, if a manufacturer simply cannot predict with any degree of 
certainty what its liability costs will be, it may forego safety-related 
expenditures that by hindsight would have been unquestionably 
rational.22 
To the extent that the absence of inevitability and predictability 
diverts firms from competing to reduce safety-related costs, the incen-
tive structure of the tort system is impaired. Consumers, because they 
are unable to fully assess all the risks associated with competing prod-
ucts, must rely on the internalization of accident costs to signal rela-
tive risks. But when the internalization process is incomplete or 
inaccurate, consumers may not be able to identify those products that 
embody a socially optimal level of safety. As a result, when viewed 
retrospectively,23 overall social investment in safety may be too low, 
21. As used here, the concept of inevitability refers to the probability that a harm-causing 
producer will actually be forced to pay the full amount of whatever liability is legally incurred 
and imposed. The concept of predictability, on the other hand, relates to the certainty with 
which a producer can determine ahead of time the extent to which various production decisions 
will generate liability costs. 
22. Conversely, if liability consequences cannot be accurately predicted, the manufacturer 
may err in the opposite direction and invest too heavily in safety. See note 15 supra. 
23. Of course, proponents of the social efficiency model might properly object that the proper 
test is whether the tort system is efficient ex ante, i.e., whether its liability rules encourage 
producers to make decisions that minimize expected social costs, rather than whether the out-
comes, ex post, of such decisions reflect society's preferences on risk and safety. This article does 
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compensation and risk spreading may be inadequate, and firms that do 
invest in optimal levels of safety may nonetheless go unrewarded by 
the market. In this regard, the expansion of product liability rules 
during this century can be viewed collectively as an effort to enhance 
the social efficiency of the tort system by increasing the inevitability 
and predictability of liability.24 
Consider, for example, the "citadel" of privity that insulated nine-
teenth-century manufacturers from tort liability when they lacked a 
direct contractual relationship with their product's ultimate consumer. 
This doctrine, although perhaps justifiable on other grounds,25 under-
cut tort law's ability to penalize directly, through higher liability costs, 
those producers that underinvested in safety. A socially irresponsible 
producer - one that failed to strike the proper balance between safety 
and risk - that distributed its product through intermediaries might 
still incur lower accident costs and therefore market its product at a 
lower price than a responsible producer of the same product that dealt 
directly with the ultimate consumer. 26 The product market, "fooled" 
by the lower price of the riskier product, might tolerate a lower level 
of care, or a higher level of production, than was socially optimal. 
Judicial abrogation of the privity doctrine,27 by eliminating a liability-
evading strategy that bore no direct relation to enhanced safety, cor-
rected this market distortion and focused the cost-reducing calculus of 
manufacturers more singularly on the issue of safety.28 
Similarly, the more recent shift from negligence to strict liability 
for defective products can be viewed as a means of improving the pre-
dictability of liability. While, unlike the privity doctrine, both negli-
gence and strict liability address the issue of safety, the outcome of a 
case is more difficult to predict under negligence than under strict lia-
not challenge this general premise, but instead questions whether in a tort system, plagued by 
uncertainty and the potential for liability evasion, the concept of ex ante efficiency carries much 
substance. See text at note 53 infra. 
24. A good historical account of the evolution of modem products liability law can be found 
in Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
796 (1983). 
25. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL Sruo. 645, 
654-64 (1985) (arguing that privity limitation allowed manufacturers to better predict and insure 
against liability). 
26. Of course, even under a privity regime, the producer's retail distributors would be ex-
posed to full liability. Yet, as noted below, such liability buffers can be structured in such a way 
that the aggregate liability of the entire enterprise is less than that which would occur if the 
manufacturer stood in direct privity with the consumer. See text at notes 65-69 infra. 
27. See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 
1099 (1960). 
28. Cf Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 547-49 (arguing that abolition ofprivity 
enhanced efficiency because modem products are too complex for consumers to assess risks 
through inspection). 
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bility. Negligence, in essence, requires a manufacturer not only to pre-
dict the number of injuries that its products will cause, but also to 
make a fairly sophisticated legal judgment about the likelihood of lia-
bility. By limiting this second inquiry,29 strict liability makes it easier 
for manufacturers to make reliable judgments about the benefits - in 
terms of lower liability costs - of further investments in safety.30 
This is not to suggest, however, that tort law has solved all 
problems of inevitability and predictability. Indeed, at the outer limits 
of reform the goals of greater predictability and greater inevitability 
may become incompatible.31 As an example, consider a mythical ju-
risdiction in which the sole standard governing tort liability is: "Mar-
ket only reasonably safe products, or pay the consequences." 
Assuming perfect enforcement, such a standard operates with com-
plete inevitability. It tolerates no excuses to its proscription, and thus 
every producer feels the full impact of a failure to comply. Yet, despite 
its perfect after-the-fact inevitability, such a standard suffers from 
before-the-fact unpredictability. A producer, faced only with the stan-
dard, must make very difficult determinations as to what, in retro-
spect, will be considered "reasonably safe" and what will be the 
"consequences" of failure to meet this standard. Any errors in these 
predictions will cause the producer to inadvertently violate the 
standard. 
The traditional response to such problems of predictability is to 
replace the vague, all-encompassing standard with more specific liabil-
ity rules. 32 The more detailed the rules, the more accurately the pro-
ducer can assess various production options and select one that is 
socially optimal. Yet, for several reasons, this process of specification 
typically fails to produce completely predictable rules. First, regard-
less of whether such rules are generated legislatively, administratively, 
or judicially, obvious costs accompany enhanced predictability.33 In 
the products liability context, for example, perfect predictability might 
29. One must be careful not to overstate the "strictness" of strict liability. Although the rule 
eliminates the general inquiry into the reasonableness of the producer's behavior, similar open· 
ended reasonableness inquiries reappear when the question concerns whether the product was 
defective as designed or marketed. See Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products 
Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 925-26 (1981); Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 554. 
Thus, to some extent, the uncertainty that surrounds negligence determinations still survives 
under a "strict" product liability regime. 
30. See Henderson, supra note 14, at 1040; Henderson, supra note 29, at 932-33. 
31. See generally D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. I (1983); Ehrlich & Pos-
ner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Kennedy, Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
32. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 31, at 37-38; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 31, at 261. 
33. See generally Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 31, at 267-68. 
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be achieved only if the rules specified precisely - down to the last nut 
and bolt - the design and characteristics of a reasonably safe, liabil-
ity-free product. Even the most detailed safety rules now existing, 
such as those in the occupational safety area, fall short of such total 
specificity, and thus suggest the existence of an irreducible minimum 
of uncertainty that is too costly to eradicate through prescriptive 
rulemaking. 
Moreover, the effort to increase predictability by substituting spe-
cific rules for general standards typically proceeds at the expense of 
the inevitability of the legal regime as a whole. In this process of spec-
ification, the comprehensive, general standard must be retooled into an 
entire set of more precise rules governing numerous situations. While 
any individual rule might be inevitable in its application, the limits of 
human foresight, the imprecision of language, and the corrosive effects 
of time make it highly improbable that the set of specific rules fash-
ioned to replace a general standard will cover exactly the same con-
duct as that covered by the standard. 34 Instead, the set of such rules is 
likely to be both underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to the 
standard, and less capable of adapting to changing social attitudes re-
garding safety. Thus, the process of specification, while decreasing 
problems of predictability, increases problems of inevitability by gen-
erating a dissonance between the standard society wishes producers to 
follow and the rules it establishes to clarify that standard. 35 
This root conflict between the inevitability and the predictability of 
rules suggests that the most a legal system can strive for is an optimum 
balance between the two. That is, the best liability regime that can 
actually be realized is neither perfectly predictable nor perfectly inevi-
table, but instead is one that balances these factors to the point that 
increasing one will cause a greater diminution of the other. 
Replacing tort theory's implicit assumption of perfect predictabil-
ity and inevitability with the notion of an equilibrium between the two, 
however, has some unpleasant implications for the capacity of the tort 
system to generate efficient outcomes. Because even an optimally 
designed rule is unlikely to be completely inevitable, producers of ex-
cessive risk may nonetheless escape bearing the full cost of such harm 
by virtue of a loophole or oversight in the liability rule. Similarly, the 
residual uncertainty concerning application of the rule may cause even 
34. D'Amato, supra note 31, at 39 ("[R]eal-world variety outstrips the ability of legislatures 
to catch up to the ingenuity of persons who, disadvantaged by the law on the books, modify and 
adjust their conduct to cast doubt upon any attempt ... to bring them to legal account."). 
35. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 31, at 268 ("Greater specificity of legal obligation gen-
erates allocative inefficiency as a result of the necessarily imperfect fit between the coverage of a 
rule and the conduct sought to be regulated."). 
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those producers that strive to predict and balance safety and accident 
costs - that is, to act in a socially efficient manner - to fall some-
what askew of the mark.36 Whether such producers still retain a com-
petitive advantage over unsafe producers, as suggested by the social 
efficiency model, is a difficult and largely empirical question. At the 
very least, however, the inherent limits on simultaneously improving 
predictability and inevitability sully the model's surface tidiness with 
the prospect of unavoidable errors by manufacturers striving to solve 
the safety calculus. 
C. Risk Uncertainty and Rule Instability 
Aside from these theoretical limitations on formulating liability 
rules, the operation of the tort system may generate uncertainties that 
undermine the goal of social efficiency. As noted, the social efficiency 
model of tort anticipates that manufacturers will price their products 
to cover accident costs. However, unlike most other types of produc-
tion costs, 37 accident costs generally are not distributed evenly across a 
product line. Typically, not all units produced will be defective, not 
all defective units will ultimately cause injury, not all injuries will be 
the same, and not all injured parties will pursue tort remedies and 
succeed. Within limits, however, these sorts of uncertainties pose no 
real problem for the effective functioning of tort law. As long as a 
manufacturer can reasonably predict the total liability that a product 
line will incur over its lifetime, it can incorporate in the price of each 
unit an amount that, when aggregated across the entire product line, 
will cover all accident costs. 3s 
Under certain circumstances, however, this predictive process may 
falter. First, as several of the recent "mass tort" cases illustrate, some 
risks from a product may not be discovered until long after it has en-
tered the marketplace. These "remote" risks pose a particularly diffi-
cult dilemma for the manufacturer. The manufacturer could engage in 
36. Indeed, if the liability consequences of various production decisions become too unpre-
dictable, manufacturers may find it more cost-effective to invest in the appearance of safety and 
the intensive litigation of safety issues, rather than in safety itself. See Oi, Tort Law as a Regula-
tory Regime: A Comment on Landes and Posner, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 439 (1984). 
37. For example, labor, energy, and raw material costs involved in the manufacture of a 
product are typically constant throughout a production run. 
38. A manufacturer may handle this process itself, thus self-insuring. More commonly, how-
ever, product manufacturers contract with a commercial insurer for coverage of at least a portion 
of their product liability claims. In either case, the manufacturer is seeking to insure that suffi-
cient funds will be available to compensate the victims of accidents that were not worth avoiding. 
For a discussion of the actual methods of estimating products liability costs, see INTERAGENCY 
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT V-9 to V-17 
(1978) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
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an extensive research and testing program aimed at uncovering all 
such risks, but at some point the costs and delay involved in such a 
program become prohibitive. 39 Moreover, such a program may still 
fail to identify all risks associated with the product. Thus, the manu-
facturer of a new product typically decides - somewhere short of per-
fect information - what liabilities are likely to be associated with the 
product. 40 But if this estimate is wrong, and the harm caused by the 
product is more severe than estimated, the tort system may impose 
unanticipated costs on the manufacturer.41 In such cases, the social 
efficiency model might still characterize the producer's original behav-
ior as "efficient," for the producer has attempted to minimize the ex-
pected social costs of its production decision. Yet such a label holds 
little comfort for a producer rendered insolvent by unforeseen 
liabilities. 
In addition, even if all risks are known, instability in tort law itself 
may impair the predictive function. For example, modifications of 
tort doctrine - such as the movement from negligence to strict liabil-
ity, the abandonment of privity, the emergence of market share causa-
tion theories, or the rapid expansion of successor liability theories -
may, as noted above, ultimately improve the efficiency of tort law by 
increasing the inevitability ofliability. In the short run, however, such 
doctrinal shifts may impose new and unanticipated42 liabilities on 
manufacturers that render incorrect their previous predictions regard-
ing the optimal level of investment in safety.43 Similarly, more subtle 
39. See G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 7, at 61 ("Actions that either add to direct cost or 
require additional time increase the probability that the product will fail to earn its required 
return in the marketplace."). For a thorough treatment of the problem of determining how 
extensively manufacturers should investigate for remote risk, see Schwartz, Products Liability, 
Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985). See also Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private 
Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 534-41 (1984). 
40. Schwartz, for example, argues that a manufacturer should not be held liable for injuries 
caused by unforeseen risks if "the expected costs of a research project that might have disclosed 
how dangerous the product actually is exceeded the expected gain from knowing this." 
Schwartz, supra note 39, at 694-95. 
41. Thus, while one may debate precisely when the asbestos industry should have been aware 
of the full extent of danger caused by its product, no one appears to argue that such knowledge of 
risk was available at the outset of production. Id. at 693, 701-02. In hindsight, however, it is 
clear that this inadequacy in the understanding of long-term risks of asbestos resulted in a gross 
deviation from the social efficiency production and use of asbestos. Even using the most extreme 
version of when asbestos manufacturers knew of the risks associated with their product, manu-
facturers would still have produced far too much asbestos and sold it at far too cheap a price. 
42. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) 
(holding asbestos manufacturer liable for failure to warn of risk that court concedes was scientifi-
cally unknowable at time of product's sale). 
43. The history of vaccine production in the United States provides a ready example. The 
smallpox vaccine was administered during a period of relative stability in tort law; manufacturers 
were generally held harmless for adverse side effects in light of the overwhelming social consen-
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shifts in popular attitudes regarding risk can affect the safety calculus 
by, for example, reclassifying a formerly acceptable product risk as 
unreasonably dangerous or revaluing the cost of a life or a limb.44 
These forms of true uncertainty - unforeseen risk and doctrinal 
instability - obviously undercut the practical utility of tort law as a 
device for encouraging optimal investments in safety.45 Yet tort 
courts have, by and large, overlooked the critical impact of such forms 
of uncertainty on the effective functioning of tort law.46 And to the 
extent that they have perceived the problem, their response is often 
strikingly simplistic. Insurance is invariably prescribed as a universal 
salve for the problems of uncertainty;47 tidy, periodic premiums re-
place the chaos of predicting future liability, thus allowing the manu-
facturer to make rational choices between paying for accident 
avoidance or for accident compensation. 
Unfortunately, this near-religious faith in insurance is seriously 
misguided.48 The premiums set by an insurer are derived from the 
same predictive process used by a self-insuring manufacturer, and thus 
are subject to similar limitations.49 An insurer, like a manufacturer, 
sus concerning the value of the program. The polio vaccines, however, confronted a tort system 
beginning to abandon this negligence-based concept in favor of the emerging doctrine of strict 
liability. This change, combined with others, resulted in substantial, unforeseen tort judgments 
against producers. See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Manage-
ment in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 286-89 (1985). As such uncertainties continue, 
many drug manufacturers have abandoned the vaccine market altogether. See note 111 infra. 
44. See generally Henderson, supra note 29. 
45. See G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 7, at 21; Danzon, supra note 39, at 534-36; Ep-
stein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1190-92 (1986). Cf. 
Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J, LEGAL 
STUD. 291, 305 (1980) ("To hold a defendant liable for unforeseeable kinds of damage will not 
encourage him to abstain from the harm-producing activity or to undertake any avoidance meas-
ures .... [L]iability under such circumstances is genuinely without efficiency-enhancing value."). 
46. Some proponents of the social efficiency model of tort law have recognized, to some 
extent, the potentially debilitating effect of such uncertainty on the model's functioning. See 
Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 566-67 (noting long product life of many modern 
goods creates greater chance of legal error in assessing liability). 
47. Indeed, most of the central decisions in the development of modern products liability law 
expressly rely on the availability of insurance as a factor justifying expansion of liability. See, 
e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (lst Cir. 1974); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, ISO P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Ray v. Alad 
Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 33 560 P.2d 3, 10 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 581 (1977); Sindell v. Abbott Labora-
tories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-46 (1980). See 
generally Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 648 (1985) 
("The silent assumption ... shared by much of the modern writing about products liability law, 
is that the availability and affordability of liability insurance should be taken as a given that 
survives whatever the choice of liability rules."). 
48. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 
(1987) (discussing failure of courts to understand interaction of legal rules and insurance 
function). 
49. See Danzon, supra note 39, at 536 ("[S]ociolegal risk creates parameter uncertainty by 
destroying the insurer's ability to predict the loss distribution with any accuracy."). If anything, 
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must attempt to estimate future liability based on known information 
concerning a procJuct's risks and the legal system's translation of such 
risks into accident costs. An unforeseen risk, by definition, cannot be 
included in the predictive process used to set an insurance premium or 
establish the level of contributions to a self-insured producer's reserve 
fund. And changes in the tort process, while arguably more foresee-
able than remote product risks, 5~ are nonetheless generally too unpre-
dictable to be accounted for accurately in projecting future accident 
costs.51 Thus, rather than constituting an "exogenous given"52 capa-
ble of taming all uncertainties, insurance serves a far more modest 
function of imposing certainty where risks and liabilities are already 
reasonably predictable. But it can do little to handle the two forms of 
true uncertainty noted above. This limitation has important implica-
tions for the practical capacity of tort law ·to generate efficient 
outcomes. 
D. Is Efficiency Still Meaningful? 
Thus, even within the domain of tort law, various forces impair the 
mechanical precision of the social efficiency model. Under such cir-
cumstances, perhaps the best that producers can strive for is to ap-
proximate a socially optimal level of product safety. For proponents 
of the model, however, this might be enough. Since all producers, 
smart and dumb, good and evil, must compete within the confines of a 
liability system that lacks perfect certainty and inevitability, perhaps 
those that ultimately triumph in the competitive struggle despite these 
handicaps can still be characterized as efficient actors. 
commercial insurers may, despite their expertise, be less accurate in their loss predictions con-
cerning any particular manufacturer. This is because such insurers generally lump multiple risks 
and set premiums on the basis of industry-wide accident rates rather than the experience of each 
individual producer or product. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - the 
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 564-74 (1961); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 
38. See generally Priest, supra note 48. 
50. Professor Gary Schwartz argues that holding manufacturers liable under tort rules 
adopted after the conduct in question has occurred does not necessarily defeat the reasonable 
expectations of the manufacturer. "As long as the general rules of the game make clear in ad-
vance that the specific rules of the game are subject to change, the player cannot complain about 
per se unfairness merely because such a change is in fact effected." Schwartz, supra note 24, at 
817. But for a proponent of the social efficiency model, this estoppel-based notion is obviously 
not enough. The ability of producers to determine what constitutes socially efficient behavior 
depends not simply on anticipating that the law may change, but also on being able to predict 
precisely the liability costs involved in such changes. Yet, as Schwartz himself demonstrates, 
there are multiple factors that bedevil even a manufacturer who deliberately attempts to predict 
such doctrinal shifts. Id. at 826-28. Thus, as he notes, "when the goal of tort law is to influence 
defendant behavior, it is a dubious practice to apply a novel rule retroactively." Id. at 828. 
51. See id. at 825 (criticizing retroactive application of unforeseeable liability rule as ineffec-
tive in spreading risk and promoting efficient production and pricing decisions). 
52. Epstein, supra note 47, at 654. 
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It is critical to note, however, precisely how pale this concept of ex 
ante efficiency can become. As predictability and inevitability de-
crease, the value of liability rules in establishing clear incentives for 
proper behavior correspondingly declines. To be sure, the rules may 
still impose excessive costs on some producers after the fact, should 
their previous calculations prove incorrect. But such sanctions are 
more likely to be viewed as random penalties devoid of meaning than 
as costs that could have been avoided with more diligence and fore-
thought. 53 At the same time, other producers may be rewarded in the 
market for their "efficient" behavior even though such behavior, real-
istically viewed, constitutes nothing more than good guessing. 54 Thus, 
in the worst case, efficiency is transformed from a conduct guiding 
norm to a rather impoverished descriptive label. 
This scenario, in which residual vagueness, remote risk, and doc-
trinal instability undercut the tort system's ability to provide useful 
signals to producers, still assumes that all producers are equally sub-
ject to, and influenced by, whatever dictates the tort system still man-
ages to provide. But as shall be seen, features of other areas of law 
make even this mild assumption problematic. 
II. TORT LAW AND COMPETING INCENTIVES 
The actors tort law seeks to control also respond to incentives and 
constraints created by other bodies of law, and in some cases these 
influences run counter to those of tort law. Thus, for example, the tax 
code, the mechanics of insurance, and the rules regarding indemnifica-
tion all affect, to some extent, the liability-related behavior of produ-
cers. This article, however, focuses on corporate and bankruptcy law, 
for these components of the broader legal environment pose the most 
direct challenge to the incentive structure of tort law. Specifically, 
while the efficacy of tort law depends on the imposition of full liability 
on all actors for their torts, the keystone of both corporate and bank-
ruptcy law is the ability of firms, under some circumstances, to avoid 
paying all or part of their liabilities. 55 Indeed, from the perspective of 
53. See generally G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 7 (discussing inability of tort system to 
convey useful signals to producers). 
54. See generally Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
211, 213 (1950) ("[T]he greater the uncertainties of the world, the greater is the possibility that 
profits would go to venturesome and lucky rather than to logical, careful, fact-gathering 
individuals."). 
55. The concept of evasion discussed here should be distinguished from the efforts of firms to 
limit liabilities by vigorously defending against tort suits, negotiating favorable settlements, and 
so forth. In those cases, a producer is simply attempting to avoid, defer, manage, or limit the 
actual imposition of a judgment of liability. Such actions are consistent with the social efficiency 
model, for that model assumes that the litigation process is an appropriate vehicle for establish-
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a business lawyer, the failure to consider liability containment and 
avoidance in structuring corporate transactions can often constitute 
malpractice. 56 Thus, any realistic assessment of the social efficiency 
model must include an inquiry into the nature and impact of such 
liability-avoiding strategies. 
A. The Nature, Benefits and Costs of Liability Evasion 
The legal system's acceptance of liability evasion is reflected most 
clearly in the corporate law doctrine of limited liability, now pre-
scribed by statute in virtually all jurisdictions. 57 Under a limited lia-
bility regime, the owners of a corporation are, absent exceptional 
circumstances,58 completely shielded from personal liability. In the 
event that the value of claims against the corporation, including those 
based on tort liability, exceeds the value of the corporation's assets, the 
owners stand to lose only their investment in the corporation. This 
cap on liability serves a number of important - and beneficial -
functions. It encourages business formation by sparing entrepreneurs 
the threat of personal financial ruin. Similarly, limited liability widens 
the social base of business ownership and improves the liquidity and 
efficiency of the equity markets by limiting the risks faced by share-
holders to the size of their investment. It also frees investors of the 
high costs of individually monitoring management behavior that they 
would otherwise incur if the firm's business failure could be visited 
without limitation on them regardless of their equity stake in the com-
pany. Finally, limited liability may decrease the cost of capital by 
shifting a portion of the risks of insolvency to creditors who, as a class, 
may be more efficient risk-bearers than shareholders.59 
ing the true costs of accidents. Thus, a manufacturer that vigorously opposes a tort plaintiff's 
claim is not evading liability but is instead seeking an accurate determination of the existence of 
liability. The con«ept of liability evasion used here, in contrast, pertains solely to devices that 
allow producers to avoid paying liabilities that already have been established. 
56. See note 127 infra. 
57. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 89 (1985); Halpern, Trebilock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980); Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L.. 
REV. 979 (1971); Manne, Our Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 
(1967). 
58. Courts in equity traditionally have "pierced the veil" of limited liability if a corporation 
was grossly undercapitalized with respect to its potential obligations, the corporate form was 
employed to defraud, or the owners of the corporation significantly failed to observe corporate 
formalities. Although the wisdom of and justifications for such intervention have been much 
debated, see generally Hamilton, supra note 57; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, it is impor-
tant to note that limited liability is universally upheld when the sole argument for disregarding 
the doctrine is that a corporation's liabilities, including tort judgments, have exceeded its assets. 
59. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 93-97 (summarizing justifications 
for limited liability). 
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Despite its utility, however, the doctrine of limited liability poses 
special problems for an incentive system, such as tort law, that relies 
on the full incorporation of expected accident costs into product prices 
as a means of signalling consumers about relative product risks. Con-
sider, for example, a product that can be produced in two different 
forms. In one form, the product is expected to incur accident costs 
with an average present value60 of $4 per unit, and cost $2 to produce. 
Thus, the product must be priced at $6 per unit simply to cover liabil-
ity and production costs. Produced a different and safer way, how-
ever, the product will incur lower expected accident costs - say, $2 
per unit - but cost slightly more - $3 per unit - to produce. The 
social efficiency model predicts that a rational firm will identify and 
choose this second method, for doing so minimizes combined safety 
and liability costs and thereby allows the firm to market the product at 
a lower, more competitive price - just over $5 - and still make a 
profit. 
This decisionmaking model assumes that producers will consider 
the full cost of accidents when making production and pricing deci-
sions. Accident costs differ, however, from other production costs in 
that significant delays often exist between the initial production deci-
sions and the imposition of liability. Defective products may not cause 
injuries, or the injuries may not manifest themselves, for significant 
periods of time.61 Even after injuries have occurred, years can be con-
sumed in litigation before claims are reduced to judgments and those 
judgments are satisfied. This delay creates the potential, at least in the 
short run, for a third production and pricing decision in which the 
firm markets the product in its more dangerous form, but does not 
incorporate ultimate liability costs into the price.62 Thus, in the above 
example, a firm unconcerned with delayed liability costs could market 
the product in its more dangerous form for just over $2 - the basic 
production costs - and still earn a profit. 
The doctrine of limited liability directly encourages adopting this 
strategy of ignoring delayed liability costs. If the law enforced a re-
gime of unlimited liability - pursuing the producer, and its owners if 
60. Although product-related accidents will occur in the future, the producer must select the 
appropriate mixture of accident and avoidance costs when the initial production decision is 
made. Thus, rather than basing its calculation on the full costs of accidents that might occur, the 
producer need only compare the discounted present value of such expected accident costs against 
the costs of altering the production process to avoid such accidents. 
61. See generally Schwartz, supra note 39. 
62. See id. at 710 (if imposition of accident costs is delayed, business might seek to "earn 
enough in the accident-free period to recover start-up costs and make a profit"), 715 (in 
" 'delayed risk' contexts, limited liability actually can create a pathological incentive for entre· 
preneurs to operate firms without full insurance and thereby to externalize risk"). 
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necessary, until all liabilities were satisfied __:_ a liability avoidance 
strategy of this type would make little sense. The inflated initial prof-
its would eventually be absorbed by the onset of liabilities, and the 
firm would ultimately suffer a competitive disadvantage because it 
marketed the product in a socially inefficient form. But limited liabil-
ity prevents this day of reckoning from occurring by immunizing .the 
firm's owners from liability once the claims exceed the value of the 
firm. To be sure, the crushing onset of tort liability will eventually 
compel liquidation of the firm, 63 but prior to its elimination from the 
market it will have produced excess risk ·from a social efficiency 
perspective. 64 
Other business strategies similarly allow producers to ignore or 
discount delayed liability costs when making production and pricing 
decisions. For example, a manufacturer may further exploit the doc-
trine of limited liability by placing its riskier activities in a separate 
subsidiary corporation, thereby limiting its actual accident costs to the 
amount of its investment in the subsidiary. 65 Alternatively, a firm that 
63. Id. at 715. Nor is the eventual elimination of liability-evading firms from the market 
sufficient to achieve social efficiency. See text at notes 103-05 infra. 
64. Consistent with the social efficiency model, this portrayal of the negative impact of lim-
ited liability assumes that consumers are poorly informed about the liability-evading potential of 
the producers whose products they purchase. If the opposite were true, limited liability would 
pose no problem for the effective functioning of the tort system. Consumers would simply pay 
less for products manufactured by firms that might seek to avoid full liability, because in such 
cases the consumer would bear the cost of insuring against the residual loss evaded by the pro-
ducer. In this sense, the problem of limited liability directly parallels the problem of product 
safety: if consumers are fully informed, they can alter their purchasing behavior to account for 
different levels of risk, but if they are poorly informed, the tort system to be efficient must de-
velop an alternate means of signalling product safety. 
Unfortunately, the social efficiency model only appears to account for one form of informa-
tional deficiency. It assumes that consumers are inadequately informed about product safety, 
and thus views strict liability as a necessary means for indirectly compounding safety information 
into product price. See notes 10-19 supra and accompanying text. But it pays little attention to 
the parallel problem of inadequate consumer understanding of the liability-evading potential of 
individual producers even though, as a practical matter, consumers are likely to be at least as ill-
informed on this issue as on that of product safety. See note 104 infra. 
65. See generally Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 
(1986); Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 
42 U. CH!. L. REV. 589 (1975). The strategic use of subsidiaries alone does not necessarily 
impair the efficient functioning of the tort system. Ifthe subsidiary, operating as an independent 
business, is fully responsible for accident costs caused by its products, it in theory will invest in 
safety until it reaches the appropriate equilibrium. Yet, in practice, subsidiaries seldom operate 
independently of the interests of their parent, and in some situations the parent's interests might 
dictate that the subsidiary underinvest in safety. For example, if problems of predictability make 
it impossible for the parent to reach an appropriate choice between safety costs and accident 
costs for a particular product, it may use a subsidiary in order to fix arbitrarily an outer limit on 
its accident costs. The parent will then use this limit - the net worth of the subsidiary - in 
determining how much to invest in safety. But because the net worth of the subsidiary may be 
significantly less than the total accident costs caused by the subsidiary's products, the aggregate 
level of investment in safety may be inadequate. In essence, the subsidiary will be sacrificed to 
contain liability. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 110-11. 
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has underinvested in safety may sell off its assets, distribute the pro-
ceeds, and dissolve before being overwhelmed by tort liability. 66 Or 
such a firm may seek to modify or discharge its tort liability through a 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. 67 The details 
of such strategies have been explored elsewhere, 68 and will not be re-
peated here; what is critical to note, however, is that all such forms of 
evasive behavior encourage a firm in the short run to produce and 
price its product without fully taking into account, as part of its ongo-
ing costs of production, the tort liability it will ultimately incur. 
Indeed, liability evasion may occur even when a producer does not 
deliberately embark on such a strategy. A manufacturer that is simply 
inept at managing safety issues, or indifferent to them, may fail to 
solve the social efficiency calculus and thus end up marketing a prod-
uct that is priced too low to cover the accident costs that will ulti-
mately occur. Because of the erroneous decision, such a manufacturer 
will enjoy an "unfair" short-term competitive advantage over its more 
responsible rivals. If it distributes the profits thereby earned to its 
owners before the onset of liabilities, the corporate and bankruptcy 
law limitations on liability just discussed will prevent full recovery of 
accident costs. Thus, properly viewed, liability-limiting strategies rep-
resent both a planning technique for firms actively seeking to ignore 
the directives of tort law and a partial, post facto absolution for those 
that unintentionally do so. 69 
Fortunately, evasion of tort liability is hardly a universal practice. 
Most businesses, most of the time, strive to anticipate and pay off their 
obligations.70 This voluntary acceptance of full liability reflects, in 
66. See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 714, 720-22; see generally Roe, Corporate Strategic Reac-
tion to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 1 (1986); Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution 011 
Products Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 865 (1971). 
67. The most notable examples of such conduct, of course, are the reorganizations in bank· 
ruptcy of Johns-Manville Corporation, plagued by asbestos-related claims, and A.H. Robins 
Company, the subject of numerous suits regarding its Dalkon Shield contraceptive device. See 
generally Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Note, The Ma11vi//e 
Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 
(1983); Note, Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of 
Times, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1984); Goldner, Final Justice for A.H. Robins, AM. LAW., Oct. 
1986, at 32. 
68. See notes 65-67 supra. 
69. The recent efforts of Johns-Manville Corporation and A.H. Robins to modify their po-
tentially overwhelming tort liabilities in bankruptcy provide ready examples of companies turn· 
ing to liability avoidance as a last resort. The widespread precautionary use of subsidiaries by 
firms that plan to fully pay liabilities reflects a similar dynamic. 
70. A corporation, for example, may place its riskier operations in separate subsidiaries in 
order to limit its own liabilities, but this protection will not actually come into play until the 
subsidiary is so overwhelmed by tort claims that it becomes insolvent. The sacrifice of the sub-
sidiary, then, is necessary to limit the liability of the parent, and the parent might determine to 
the contrary that the subsidiary is more valuable alive than dead. In such a case, the potential 
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part, the fact that evasive behavior often carries with it an array of 
costs and collateral considerations that militate against liability avoid-
ance. Most significantly, all forms of evasive behavior require the firm 
or subsidiary to liquidate or go through reorganization in order to 
evade full liability. Thus, as a threshold matter, the economic merits 
of liability avoidance will depend on whether it is more profitable for 
the enterprise to "live fast and die young" or to strive for permanence 
by playing within the rules.11 
Moreover, even when the shield of limited liability is invoked, the 
costs may extend beyond the mere liquidation of the firm. In the sub-
sidiary context, for example, the parent suffers a number of adverse 
consequences when it uses subsidiaries to limit liability. Consumer 
confidence in other product lines of the parent may be damaged if tort 
judgments overwhelm one of its subsidiaries. 72 Bankruptcy of the sub-
sidiary may also impair the parent's creditworthiness, since lenders 
will naturally be more concerned about the security ofloans to a busi-
ness that has suffered a partial failure.73 Similarly, if the parent's stock 
is publicly traded, the securities market may exert a disciplining ef-
fect. 74 Organizational pride and managerial professionalism may fur-
ther discourage liability evasion even when such behavior is rational 
from a narrow profit-or-loss perspective.75 Finally, the personal repu-
tations and career ambitions of the subsidiary management may in-
hibit the use of liability-limiting strategic behavior. 76 
These secondary costs of liability evasion - in terms of injury to 
consumer confidence in other products, organizational pride, 
limitation of liability offered by the corporate form will be of no direct use; the subsidiary's 
operations will be structured in a socially efficient manner so that tort liabilities can be fully paid 
without jeopardizing the subsidiary's existence. 
71. Indeed, as Alan Schwartz has demonstrated, in a world in which all risks are known and 
where liabilities are rapidly imposed, a manufacturing firm would typically either plan to pay all 
liabilities fully despite the existence of limited liability, or not operate at all. This is because 
much of the value of the firm is tied up in its future income stream, and thus the benefits of that 
income stream can only be realized if liabilities are not allowed to overwhelm the firm. Schwartz, 
supra note 39, at 708-10. 
72. See Roe, supra note 66, at 25; G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 7, at 50 ("[T]he major 
cost of a defect may be the loss of 'reputational capital.' "). 
73. Cf. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 
654 (1984); Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the 
Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 403 (1981); Roe, supra note 66, at 26. 
74. See, e.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL EcoN. 110, 
117 (1965); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288, 292-302 
(1980). 
75. See Roe, supra note 66, at 24 ("The destruction of the firm's operations for shareholder 
benefit would clash with the professional's operational ethic."). 
76. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 107 ("Managers who have firm-specific 
investments of human capital cannot diversify the risk of business failure."). 
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creditworthiness, equity value, and individual and institutional inter-
ests in reputation and permanence - potentially apply to all forms of 
strategic behavior, and probably explain why examples of liability 
avoidance are relatively uncommon. 77 Yet, the mere fact that corpo-
rate law allows some manufacturers to avoid part or all of the accident 
costs of their operations poses a significant theoretical challenge to the 
social efficiency model of tort law. As obvious as this conflict between 
tort theory and corporate law may seem, however, it has been all but 
ignored by most tort theorists. 78 A tort defendant, it has generally 
been assumed, is a tort defendant, fully subject to the force of liability 
rules. But a closer examination of how tort rules and the incentives to 
evade them interact in the corporate context indicates that under some 
circumstances liability evasion may cause a perverse malfunctioning of 
tort law. 
B. Actors and Incentives 
1. The Qualified, Responsible Producer 
To analyze how the corporate law's potential for evasion affects the 
social efficiency model of tort law, it is important first to examine more 
closely how that model prefers certain producers over others. In other 
words, absent the potential for evasion, what does tort theory predict 
about the characteristics of those who are best suited to produce goods 
that, aside from conferring substantial benefit, also entail substantial 
risks? As noted above, the social efficiency conception of tort law gen-
erally eschews any explicit ex ante judgments about the appropriate-
ness of specific products79 and levels of production; instead, it relies on 
77. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 66 (noting absence of widespread resort to evasive behavior). 
See also Negative Verdict: Manville's Bid to Evade Avalanche of Lawsuits Proves Disappoi11ti11g, 
Wall St. J., July 15, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (noting adverse consequences of bankruptcy filing). 
78. For example, Landes and Posner recognize the existence of limited liability, but charac· 
terize it simply as a form of business insurance. Positive Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 536. 
This view, however, overlooks the doctrine's implications for the social efficiency model. To be 
sure, from the investor's perspective, limited liability functions like insurance by capping losses. 
But from the producer's perspective (the one that tort law seeks to influence), limited liability 
differs dramatically from insurance in that it is costless once the liabilities exceed the value of the 
firm. Thus, if a producer wishes to insure against liabilities that may exceed the value of the firm, 
it must pay for insurance and the product's price therefore will indirectly signal its riskiness. But 
if limited liability is used as insurance against value-exceeding losses, the costs of such losses 
remain externalized and are not reflected in the product's price. To this extent, the tort system's 
capacity to signal risk through price is impaired. 
79. To be sure, under negligence, and under the design and marketing prongs of strict liabil· 
ity, courts do purport to make general determinations as to the reasonableness of certain deci· 
sions by producers. See note 29 supra. Yet, a negligence-based determination that a producer 
has acted unreasonably in some regard does not, by itself, always force a change in future behav· 
ior. Instead, the manufacturer often can "test" the correctness of the unreasonableness determi· 
nation by incorporating the expected costs of such liability judgments into the product price and 
letting the market assess whether the product is still reasonably priced. If so, the manufacturer 
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liability judgments and competition between producers to propel pro-
ducers toward a socially optimal level of safety for any product. The 
model further suggests that those producers who reduce accident costs 
to a socially efficient level will prevail in a competitive market over 
rivals who spend too much or too little on safety measures. 
It is unlikely, however, that a producer triumphs in this competi-
tive process simply by randomly arriving at the proper mix of safety 
and risk in its production processes. The businesses that tort law seeks 
to influence vary enormously in size, age, organization, institutional 
experience, capital structure, management orientation, and myriad 
other ways, and it is reasonable to assume that some of these charac-
teristics combine to make certain producers more skilled than others 
in optimizing accident costs. 8° Consider, for example, two firms that 
both wish to market a product for which a ready demand exists. Firm 
A is an established concern with substantial experience in developing 
related products. It has a well-trained, professional and committed 
management. By virtue of its track record, it enjoys easy access to 
capital markets and a high level of consumer confidence. Firm B, in 
contrast, is formed solely to meet the demand for the new product. Its 
management is thin and unseasoned, its borrowing power is more lim-
ited, and it has minimal experience to draw upon. 
Assume further that the product both firms seek to market can be 
produced in several forms, all of which will meet the basic consumer 
demand, but which entail different levels of risk. 81 If all other produc-
tion costs are held constant, long-term success in the product's market 
will depend on each firm's ability to identify and market the product 
in the form that embodies a socially efficient balance between safety 
and risk. But although both producers are capable of producing the 
product in its optimal form, Firm A will be generally more likely to 
succeed under such circumstances. Its management, drawing from 
past experience and anxious to protect the goodwill and consumer 
confidence it has established, will vigorously seek to identify the safety 
may decide to continue behaving "negligently." Thus, despite the fact that negligence determi-
nations purport to be general rulings that the producer should have invested more in safety, the 
enforcement of these determinations still often rests with the market. See Calabresi, Optimal 
Deterrence and Accidents, supra note 3, at 660-61. 
80. For explorations of the significant differences in corporate size and functioning, see Con-
ard, The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 440 (1975); M. EI-
SENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). 
81. Lawnmowers, for example, cut grass; most seem to be equally adept at this simple task. 
Despite this constant function, there remains a significant potential for variation in the safety of 
different designs. A manufacturer must decide how explosion-proof to make the engine, how 
automatic to make the engine shut-off, how shielded to make the blade housing, how disintegra-
tion-resistant to make the blade, and so forth. 
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risks associated with producing the product in its various forms. 82 Its 
income from other products, combined with its access to capital mar-
kets, will permit it to finance research and development and delay in-
troduction of the product until it answers safety concerns and then 
selects the most socially efficient product form. 
Firm B, in contrast, is less likely to undertake or satisfactorily re-
solve the necessary safety calculus. Its limited experience will make it 
less sensitive to safety concerns and less adept at solving such 
problems, and its limited income and borrowing power will deny it the 
luxury of an extended research and development program. Thus, it is 
more likely that Firm B will fail to identify the optimal product form, 
and thus suffer a competitive disadvantage. 
This model of competition under tort liability rules is obviously 
very stylized. In reality, individual producers fall all along the spec-
trum between the extremes identified above, and the importance of 
individual factors may vary significantly between industries. Nonethe-
less, the model does illustrate a proposition that seems intuitively cor-
rect: the existence of certain organizational attributes such as size, 
product line diversity, past experience, managerial professionalism, 
long-range planning, commitment to quality, capital market access, 
and existing consumer confidence should correlate positively with a 
firm's ability to behave in a socially efficient manner when producing a 
new, and potentially dangerous, product. 83 This proposition thus 
lends some predictive power to tort theory. Specifically, the analysis 
suggests that when a product poses significant safety concerns, firms 
with a significant number of the qualities noted above should dominate 
the product market because of their enhanced ability to avoid exces-
sive liability costs. 
Tort theory's implicit preference for having "qualified" producers 
dominate the markets for potentially risky products assumes, of 
course, that such producers will not succumb to the temptations of-
fered by liability-limiting strategies. Fortunately, many of the same 
factors that make such a firm better qualified to solve the social effi-
ciency calculus correctly also make it likely that such a firm will be-
have responsibly from tort law's perspective. Consider, for example, 
the deliberations of the well-established Firm A concerning the use of 
82. See Huber, supra note 43, at 303-04 & n.106. 
83. Cf G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 7, at 46-51 (discussing relationship between firm 
attributes and commitment to safety); Roe, supra note 66, at 51-55 (noting competitive advan· 
tages of multi-product firms); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 109-10 (noting that 
problems causing judicial disregard of limited liability typically occur with small, closely held 
corporations). Indeed, the factors enhancing a firm's ability to optimize product safety generally 
enhance a firm's competitiveness in other aspects of its operations as well. 
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a subsidiary to limit liability that may be generated by the production 
of a new, potentially risky product. As noted above, the use of such a 
strategy allows the firm to market the product in an unsafe form and 
earn high short-term profits by failing to include delayed liability costs 
in the product's price. To be sure, tort liability will ultimately over-
whelm the subsidiary and destroy Firm A's investment, but in the in-
terim it may have made a sufficient return to justify the loss. 
Nonetheless, Firm A's planning analysis is unlikely to hinge solely 
on such a myopic monetary calculus. Instead, Firm A will consider 
the damage that its subsidiary's tort liabilities will have on consumer 
confidence in and demand for its other products. It will worry about 
the impact of its subsidiary's bankruptcy on its status with its creditors 
and its valuation by the equity markets. And even absent such mone-
tary costs, management interest in institutional permanence, personal 
reputation, and career impact may discourage liability evasion. 84 
Thus, while Firm A may use a subsidiary to protect against unforeseen 
events, it is likely nonetheless to insist that the subsidiary produce and 
price the product in a socially optimal fashion. 
Thus far, the analysis is reassuring: the producers that are most 
qualified to produce potentially dangerous products also have little in-
centive to engage in liability-evading behavior. The product market, 
however, is not populated solely by such qualified, responsible actors. 
These favored producers instead must often compete with firms that 
are neither as adept at making socially efficient production decisions 
nor as concerned about the consequences of evading liability. Such 
competition, which obviously has significant adverse implications for 
the social efficiency model, is likely to come from at least two quarters. 
2. The Qualified but Irresponsible Producer 
First, qualified producers may face competition from irresponsible 
producers within their own ranks. This may seem paradoxical at first, 
for it has just been noted that the qualities that make a producer well-
qualified to undertake risk-producing activities also tend to encourage 
it to behave responsibly. This alignment of incentives, however, oc-
curs primarily on the institutional level: as an entity, a qualified firm 
typically views liability avoidance as an unacceptable business strategy 
because of the high costs - in terms of injury to reputation and good-
84. Indeed, managerial professionalism and concern for reputation may, in some cases, pre-
vent managers from engaging in some forms of evasive behavior, such as liquidation of the firm 
prior to the accumulation of a fatal level of liabilities, even though such actions might clearly be 
in the best interest of the shareholders. See Roe, supra note 66, at 23-25. See also J.K. GAL-
BRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 176 (1967) (noting tendency of established enterprises to 
value stability and steady growth over high-risk, high-return strategies). 
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will, impairment of credit, impact on other product lines, and so forth 
- that such behavior generates. This general institutional preference 
against liability avoidance and for socially efficient behavior, however, 
must be translated to and implemented in the context of numerous, 
specific decisions surrounding the design, production, and marketing 
of individual products. Recent scholarship regarding the organiza-
tional behavior of large institutions suggests that, during this transla-
tion process, the entity's interest in complying with legal norms may 
be sacrificed by managers within the firm to further their short-term 
interests. 85 In such cases, even responsible firms - ones that are insti-
tutionally inclined to plan for and pay all their liabilities - may cross 
the line into socially inefficient behavior. 
To observe this negative dynamic, consider once more our proto-
typical qualified producer, Finn A, as it undertakes manufacture of a 
new, potentially risk-creating product to fill an apparent consumer de-
mand. In a large enterprise, the project will usually be assigned to a 
specific division or subsidiary of the firm. Although the managers of 
the project will typically be aware of the firm's general interest in com-
plying fully with liability rules, they may also face other, potentially 
conflicting criteria for judging their performance.86 Specifically, the 
tendency in many large-scale enterprises for central management to 
view internal divisions as competitors for the firm's capital allocations 
and, accordingly, to assess their performance in terms of short-term 
profitability, 87 creates pressures on project managers to ignore safety 
concerns that will not immediately affect profitability.88 
This short-term managerial focus, unfortunately, dovetails with 
the significant time delays between product manufacture and accident 
occurrence that characterize many product risks. Thus, if the new 
85. See generally Henderson, supra note 6, at 780-83; Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: 
Toward A Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and An Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 1099, 1131-36 (1977); Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Fama, supra note 74; C. 
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975). 
86. See Coffee, supra note 73, at 398-99. 
87. See Henderson, supra note 6, at 781-82; Coffee, supra note 73, at 393, 397; W. KLEIN & 
J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 159 (2d ed. 1986); 0. WILLIAMSON, MAR• 
KETS AND HIERARCHIES 132-37 (1975); R. CYERT & ], MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF 
THE FIRM 119 (1963). 
88. Indeed, as Professor Coffee notes, such misbehavior constitutes a type of "benevolent 
misconduct" that arises not from a direct conflict between the interests of the managers and the 
shareholders, but at least potentially from variations in the time frame for assessing profitability. 
Coffee, supra note 85, at 1105 & n.13. See also Coffee, supra note 73, at 394 ("Necessarily, the 
manager acts within a shorter time frame than the firm (if only because in the long run, the 
manager, unlike his firm, will be dead), and thus may focus more on short-run profit 
maximization."). 
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project entails some remote risks - ones that will occur, if at all, only 
years in the future - project managers have strong incentives to ig-
nore or minimize such safety concerns. The alternative, addressing 
such concerns through further research and testing, inevitably entails 
costs and delays that will reduce short-term profitability.89 Moreover, 
the ethos of management may not reward such caution, but instead 
misconstrue it as ineptitude, mismanagement, or lack of initiative.90 
Thus, faced with competition both inside and outside the firm, and 
tom between institutional directives to move both aggressively and 
cautiously, project managers may simply gamble that the remote 
safety concerns will not occur,91 or will occur long after their associa-
tion with the project is over and forgotten.92 
Of course, such counterefficient behavior is not inevitable. Upper-
level management can develop and implement monitoring systems to 
insure that project managers keep long-term institutional interests as 
well as short-term profitability in mind when assessing safety issues. 93 
Alternatively, the firm can seek to bond or insure against the ultimate 
costs of such managerial shortcomings.94 Finally, the "market" for 
managerial talent may, to some extent, penalize a manager for past 
deeds that proved to be counterefficient in the long run.95 Yet, despite 
these constraints,96 the pressure on managers in a competitive environ-
89. See G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 7, at 61 ("[T]he product development process 
drains the firm's earnings .... [T]here is likely to be resistance to taking the time and resources 
required first to surface subtle or complex hazards and then to redesign and retest to assure that 
they have been properly dealt with."). 
90. See Coffee, supra note 85, at 1135-36; 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND 
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 51-52 (1970). 
91. Cf. Coffee, supra note 73, at 395 (discussing empirical evidence indicating that managers 
may ignore strong indications of unacceptable risks or illegality when deciding to produce poten-
tially unsafe products). 
92. For a general discussion of the problem of "sub-goal pursuit," in which middle-level 
managers confronted with inconsistent policy directives tend to sacrifice long-term institutional 
goals to further the short-term interests of the particular project, see Coffee, supra note 85, at 
1135-36. 
93. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 85, at 1147-56 (proposing "mini-boards" of directors located 
at the mid-level of the corporate structure to enhance monitoring of counterefficient behavior). 
94. See generally Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. LAW & 
ECON. 327 (1983). While insuring against managerial misbehavior may serve the compensatory 
function of tort, it probably does little to encourage socially efficient behavior. In order to signal 
consumers correctly as to the risk potential of a product, the costs of insurance would have to be 
incorporated into the specific products that would be produced in a sub-optimal form by the 
shirking project management. But because, by definition, central management does not know in 
advance when or where such behavior will occur, it is hard to see how the costs of insuring 
against it can be correctly tied to the relevant products. 
95. See generally Fama, supra note 74, at 296-98; Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Com-
mercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 60-61 (1982). 
96. Most scholarship in this area reflects some pessimism about the efficacy of such correc-
tive devices. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 6, at 770-80; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 85, at 
308; Levmore, supra note 95, at 60-61. 
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ment to maximize short-term profits can be significant. Thus, at the 
very least, the theory of the firm suggests that, even in markets popu-
lated solely by potentially responsible firms, socially efficient behavior 
is not inevitable. 
3. The Unqualified, Irresponsible Producer 
Finally, the qualified, responsible producer must compete against 
firms less endowed with the attributes of size, wealth, expertise, capital 
market access, consumer good will, and so forth. While, as noted, the 
absence of these attributes makes it less likely that a firm will be capa-
ble of marketing its product in a socially efficient form, it also makes 
the firm more immune to the collateral costs ofliability evasion.97 It is 
small, with few assets to protect. It may have no other products or 
consumer goodwill to guard. As a fledgling concern, its access to capi-
tal is already limited. If its stock is·not publicly traded, it is free from 
the disciplinary effect of the equity markets. In sum, it is less likely to 
have the same degree of institutional interest in permanence and repu-
tation as does a qualified, responsible producer. Thus, its decisions 
concerning liability evasion behavior are likely to rest more singularly 
on a narrow, cold determination of whether it will be more profitable 
to underinvest in safety and ultimately liquidate, or to spend enough 
on safety to avoid a fatal accumulation of tort liability. While the di-
rection such a decision takes will obviously vary with the specific char-
acteristics of the firm and the nature of the product, an unqualified 
firm is, on the whole, more likely than a qualified one to take the 
money and run. 
C. Product Markets and Sub-Optimal Behavior 
Thus, when the differences among producers and the incentives for 
evasion are introduced into the social efficiency model of tort, some 
disturbing predictions follow. The very characteristics that make a 
producer most likely to produce a product with a socially optimum 
level of safety are also likely to discourage that producer from engag-
ing in evasive behavior. Such a result, standing alone, is to be ap-
plauded, but it becomes troubling when such responsible producers 
must compete against others who are both less competent to address 
safety concerns and more willing to engage in evasive behavior. In 
such an event, the very competition that the social efficiency model of 
tort seeks to harness may penalize precisely those actors tort law pur-
97. See text at notes 72-76 supra. 
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ports to reward.98 As outlined below, the degree to which responsible 
producers face this type of unfair competition from evasion-prone pro-
ducers depends heavily on the nature of the particular product market. 
1. Restricted Markets 
In some cases, the nature of the product will make it unlikely that 
firms prone to evasive behavior will be able to enter the market. Spe-
cifically, when producing the product in any form requires significant 
technical expertise, long-range planning, extensive financing require-
ments, and a high degree of management competence, "fly-by-night" 
businesses will effectively be barred from the market. Correspond-
ingly, firms that are able to enter such markets, by virtue of possessing 
such qualities, are unlikely to be institutionally predisposed towards 
engaging in liability evasion.99 Thus, for example, the automobile in-
dustry is highly unlikely to provide examples of institutionally sanc-
tioned evasive behavior.100 
Similarly, complex regulatory regimes may effectively bar the entry 
of producers who are prone to evasion. By establishing costly require-
ments for design, testing, and marketing, such regimes effectively spec-
ify a minimum level of safety and limit production by unqualified 
actors. Complying with the drug registration process administered by 
the Food and Drug Administration, for instance, is only possible for 
firms with extensive experience in the drug market, sufficient resources 
to finance extensive research and development, and a management 
committed to permanence and long-range planning. 
Thus, if tort law can produce a socially efficient level of product 
safety, it is most likely to do so in such restricted product markets. 
Yet, such a result is by no means certain. Such markets, although 
dominated by qualified, responsible producers, may also be intensely 
competitive. As noted, such competitive pressures may force manag-
ers within the firm to subvert long-term interests in responsible behav-
ior in order to obtain the short-term benefits of liability evasion. 
98. Cf. Huber, supra note 43, at 291-92 (emphasis in original): 
Rigid risk internalization will promote safety only when all sources of risk within a particu-
lar risk 'market' can be held to the regulatory ideal. But if most sources of risk cannot be 
deterred by regulation, it may well be counter-productive to attack external risks from the 
remaining sources. Patchy, erratic risk internalization may impose greater costs on the safer 
substitutes within particular markets, and so may encourage a shift in consumption toward 
the more hazardous. 
99. As discussed above, however, internal organizational pressures may in some cases cause 
such firms to cross over into socially inefficient behavior. See text at notes 85-96 supra. 
100. The common practice of automobile manufacturers to vigorously oppose products lia-
bility claims does not contradict this assertion. Such efforts are not aimed at evading lawfully 
imposed liabilities, but instead simply seek to keep such costs - like other production costs - to 
a minimum. See note 55 supra. 
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Alternatively, the onset of business reversals, unforeseen liabilities, 
and other economic ills can erode the economic strength of a firm, 
and, if such problems become sufficiently severe, force the firm to re-
consider the attractiveness of liability evasion. The Chapter 11 filings 
of major corporations such as Johns Manville, A.H. Robins, and LTV 
reflect this dynamic at least in part. 
When responsible firms engage in liability avoidance, the overall 
social efficiency of even restricted markets may be impaired. Such 
conduct increases the competitive pressures on the remaining produc-
ers by forcing them to compete with producers that no longer neces-
sarily incorporate full liability costs in their product prices. 101 
Moreover, the decision of a single major actor in the market to engage 
in liability avoidance may decrease the stigma associated with such 
conduct, and thus lessen the institutional inhibitions that restrain 
other competitors from behaving similarly.102 In sum, then, the social 
efficiency model of tort may not always be viable even under favorable 
conditions. 
2. Unrestricted Markets 
Although some markets are restricted to "qualified" producers, 
many products can be manufactured by firms largely lacking such at-
tributes. For example, a power lawnmower, a ladder, a lighting fix-
ture, or a child's toy all entail distinct safety risks, yet all can be 
produced without significant expertise or capital investment. Manu-
facturers of such products, including those prone to liability evasion, 
face few bars to entry into the marketplace. 103 Instead, tort law relies 
on the eventual onset of a fatal level of liability to eliminate irresponsi-
ble firms from the market. Yet, for several reasons, this self-cleansing 
101. For example, when LTV Corp., the nation's second largest steel producer, filed for reor-
ganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, many other steel producers expressed the 
concern that they might be forced to follow suit in order to remain competitive with LTV. See 
LTV Chapter 11 Filing Will Change the Way Steel Mills Compete: Firm's Likely Edge in Labor 
and Other Costs Raises Fear of Domino Effect, Wall St. J., July 18, 1986, at 1, col. 6. 
102. For example, the decision in August 1982 of Johns-Manville Corporation, a major and 
financially solvent manufacturer, to file for bankruptcy reorganization in an effort to limit its 
asbestos-related liability dramatically altered the way most businesses perceived bankruptcy. 
Prior to Manville's filing, bankruptcy was generally equated with insolvency. See Andresky, An 
Honorable Escape?, FORBES, Oct. 7, 1985, at 108. Its action, however, eased the stigma associ-
ated with bankruptcy, and thus paved the way for other major and still solvent companies such 
as A.H. Robins and LTV to seek Chapter 11 protection. 
103. To be sure, corporate codes sometimes impose capitalization and insurance require-
ments on new enterprises. In practice, however, these requirements tend to be so minimal that 
they pose no meaningful bar to market entry and provide no real protection for tort claimants. 
See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 270 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1966). See 
generally Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. P1rr. L. REV. 
837 (1982); Landers, supra note 65, at 591-93. 
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function of tort law is probably insufficient to protect responsible pro-
ducers in unrestricted markets from unfair competition by liability-
evading producers. 
First, the tort process is slow to identify and penalize bad actors. 
A defective product may not cause injuries or the injuries may not 
manifest themselves for significant periods of time. Moreover, years 
can be consumed in litigation before claims are reduced to judgments 
and those judgments are satisfied. Only after such judgments have 
mounted to an unmanageable level will a firm be eliminated from the 
market. Until such time, however, it will have been able, by under-
investing in safety, to sell its product at a lower price than that 
charged by its responsible competitor. 
Moreover, even if the tort system were streamlined to hasten the 
winnowing process, the absence of barriers to entry into the market 
allows new, potentially irresponsible firms to quickly replace those 
that the tort system has succeeded in eliminating. Under such circum-
stances, the responsible producer faces a constantly changing array of 
competitors, none of which plays by the rules, but all of which in the 
short run can outcompete the responsible producer by underinvesting 
in safety. Thus, while evasive behavior is generally self-destructive for 
each individual actor, it can nonetheless become a permanent feature 
of an unrestricted product market. 
Of course, the.responsible producer can always attempt to combat 
this problem by highlighting its willingness to honor all claims and 
denouncing its competition's propensity to evade liability. Yet here, 
the social efficiency model itself suggests limits on the responsible pro-
ducer's efforts to educate consumers about the issue of liability eva-
sion. The model starts from the assumption that consumers are poorly 
informed about product safety, and thus relies on tort liability as a 
means of indirectly correcting this deficiency. It is unlikely, however, 
that consumers are any more capable of absorbing and acting on infor-
mation concerning the relative likelihood of liability evasion by differ-
ent producers than they are with respect to safety issues. Both types of 
information - relative product safety and relative propensity for eva-
sion - bear directly on the risks imposed on the consumer, and an 
informational deficiency in one area is likely to be mirrored by a defi-
ciency in the other.104 Thus, an effort by responsible producers to edu-
104. Indeed, consumers may be relatively better informed on product safety than on the 
propensity of various producers to evade liability. First, publications such as Consumer Reports 
do provide some information directly to consumers on product safety issues, while information 
on the propensity of firms to evade liability is likely to be found, if at all, in the speculative pages 
of the financial press. Moreover, consumers may over time develop some sophistication about 
the dangers inherent in certain products or in the products of certain manufacturers. But liabil-
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cate consumers on the issue of liability evasion is unlikely to correct 
the market distortion caused by the behavior of irresponsible firms. 
Indeed, the predicted failure of tort rules to police unrestricted 
product markets adequately is born out with respect to all four prod-
uct examples - lawnmowers, ladders, lighting fixtures, and toys -
noted above. In each case, extensive direct or indirect regulatory sys-
tems have been imposed on product manufacturers. Such regulations 
mandate acceptable levels of safety and, in so doing, create barriers to 
the easy entry into such markets by unqualified, irresponsible actors. 
This legislative conversion of unrestricted markets to restricted ones 
again suggests - contrary to the social efficiency model - that com-
petition alone may fail to drive the product market toward an optimal 
level of safety. 10s 
3. Turbulent Markets 
Finally, it is useful to consider competition between producers in 
markets plagued by substantial uncertainty, referred to here as turbu-
lent markets. As suggested earlier, responsible producers typically re-
act to uncertainty by reserving funds or purchasing insurance to cover 
all future liabilities, for failure to do so may imperil the company. 
This task presents no real challenge when risks and liability rules are 
reasonably predictable, but proves far more difficult in the face of un-
foreseeable risks and changing liability rules. In such cases, the self-
insuring producer has few good options. It can guess that liabilities 
may be worse than the then-available information suggests, and at-
tempt to reserve an extra amount to cover such a contingency. 106 Or, 
if the uncertainty over risk or future liability rules becomes too un-
comfortable, the manufacturer may simply decline to market the 
product. 
Finally, a producer in a turbulent market may seek commercial 
insurance. As noted above, however, this tactic hardly provides a uni-
versal salve for uncertainty-based problems. Instead, commercial 
product liability insurers will respond to such uncertainties in much 
the same fashion as a self-insuring producer. Since their profitability 
as insurers depends on setting a premium that exceeds actual losses, 
ity evasion, because it eliminates the actor from the market, may prevent development of a simi-
lar sort of consumer data base. 
105. Of course, one might question the extent to which such regulatory regimes themselves 
reflect a socially efficient level of safety. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that 
legislative dissatisfaction with the level of safety observed in certain markets is, at the very least, 
strong evidence that such markets are not generating adequate levels of safety. 
106. See Danzon, supra note 6, at 573 (noting practice by manufacturers of overinsuring in 
the face of legal instability). 
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insurers are likely to significantly increase premium charges in the face 
of uncertainties in order to establish an ample cushion. Or insurers 
may seek simply to withdraw coverage from particularly volatile prod-
uct areas. 
During the recent tort "crisis," both producers and insurers be-
haved in the ways discussed above, 107 and the available evidence sug-
gests that uncertainties over risks and liability rules were a significant 
cause of such behavior.108 While such responses may decrease the 
likelihood that producers and their insurers will be caught short by 
unforeseen risks or unanticipated changes in tort law, they are not nec-
essarily consistent with the social efficiency model of tort. Consider, 
for example, a manufacturer that reserves a significant amount of reve-
nue to cover unforeseen liabilities, or an insurer that sharply increases 
premium charges for the same reason. Such a strategy might, in hind-
sight, tum out to be advantageous, but it nonetheless is based only on 
a hunch, rather than on the careful attention to market incentives en-
visioned by the social efficiency model of tort law. And given the un-
certainty, it is equally plausible that the amount reserved will tum out 
to be too little or too much, and thus result in pricing or production 
decisions that are plainly inefficient in retrospect. In such cases, the 
model's promise of ex ante efficiency holds little substance. 
Similarly, the abandonment by manufacturers of certain product 
lines, or the corresponding refusal of insurers to provide coverage in 
such areas, might at first glance suggest that the tort system is working 
to eliminate excessively risky products from the market. Yet the so-
cial efficiency model mandates such a drastic measure only if the prod-
uct, in any conceivable form, causes more harm than good.109 But the 
recent wholesale exodus of manufacturers and insurers from certain 
product areas hardly suggests any careful determination that such 
107. See, e.g .. Lewin, The Liability Insurance Spiral, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1986, at 35, col. 3 
(describing dramatic premium rise and withdrawal of insurance for certain activities); Madden, 
Liability Insurance Cost is Soaring for Localities, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at Bl, col. 5 (same); 
Tarnoff, Pool Slide Firm Files Bankruptcy To Handle Product Liability Claims, 19 Bus. INS. 2 
(1985) (insurers withdraw coverage for nation's largest diving board and pool slide manufac-
turer; company resorts to Chapter 11 to contain liability). See generally Priest, supra note 48. 
108. See generally Danzon, supra note 39, at 534-43; Priest, supra note 48. For example, 
Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals abruptly withdrew the morning sickness drug Bendictin from the 
market in 1983 when it became uninsurable because of liability concerns. The withdrawal oc-
curred despite FDA studies that failed to establish a need to withdraw the drug. Epstein, supra 
note 47, at 648 & n.10. Similarly, in January 1986, G.D. Searle & Co. withdrew its IUDs, 
considered the safest on the market, when concerns over A.H. Robins Co.'s Dalkon Shield liabil-
ities caused insurers to withdraw Searle's coverage. Brody, When Products Turn into Liabilities, 
FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at 20. 
109. Thus, for example, even abandonme!lt of a very dangerous product would be inappro-
priate if it nonetheless had a high social utility and adequate substitutes were not available. 
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products have no social utility whatsoever. 110 The discontinuation of 
vaccine production by many drug concerns provides an example. 111 
Similarly, football helmets unquestionably have a positive social value, 
yet almost all sports manufacturers have abandoned their production 
in the face of liability concerns. 112 In such cases, then, uncertainty 
causes society to lose beneficial products because responsible manufac-
turers and their insurers, unwilling to gamble institutional permanence 
or profitability, head for the sidelines.113 
The debilitating effect of such uncertainty is particularly likely to 
be pronounced in unrestricted markets where both responsible and 
evasion-prone producers compete. Consider again, for example, the 
behavior of Firm A and FirmB when marketing a new, identical prod-
uct during a period when liability rules appear volatile. Suppose fur-
ther that traditional research reveals risks that translate, under then 
existing liability rules, into an average accident cost of $4 per unit. If 
other production costs equal $2 per unit, the product will be profitable 
if it is marketed at more than $6 per unit. Yet Firm A, concerned 
about additional liabilities that may spring from unforeseen risks or 
changes in liability rules, may expend further time and resources to 
search for unforeseen risks, 114 or it may seek additional insurance or 
reserve additional funds to cover unforeseen liabilities, or it may - if 
the uncertainty is too great - simply decline to market the product. 
In any event, the price of the product, if it is produced at all, will 
110. See Priest, supra note 48, at 1527 (Recent "drastic changes in insurance coverage oc· 
curred despite any evidence of increases in the underlying riskiness of the products or services 
affected by the crisis."). 
111. See Brody, supra note 108, at 22 {describing exodus from market of most manufacturers 
of seven pediatric vaccines required for children entering school). See also Kitch, Vaccines and 
Product Liability: A Case of Co11tagious Litigation, 9 REGULATION 11 (1985). The swine flu 
fiasco provides another dramatic illustration. Although Congress appropriated sufficient funds 
to inoculate all United States residents, drug manufacturers - unable to obtain insurance -
refused to market swine flu vaccines without a grant of statutory immunity from tort liability. 
National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976). 
Thus, despite an unequivocal consensus concerning its value, the swine flu vaccine would not 
have been produced absent legislative intervention disenfranchising the tort system. 
112. See Liability Penalties Drive Scared Wilson Out of Helmet Game, 13 Bus. INS. 1 (Sept. 
17, 1979) (discussing decisions of major sports manufacturers to abandon helmet production 
because of risk of high liability judgments). 
113. See, e.g., Berkowitz, Canada Attracts U.S. Women Seeking IUDs, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 
1986, at 33, col. 3 (noting trend of U.S. women to obtain IUDs in Canada after major U.S. 
manufacturer abandoned market in face of liability concerns). See generally Priest, supra note 
48, at 1563 (suggesting that because sociolegal uncertainty has been skewed in the direction of 
increasing risk of liability, insurance function has been impaired). 
114. However, as previously noted, a rational firm in a competitive environment will typi-
cally terminate its research into potential product risks somewhere short of perfect knowledge. 
See note 39 supra and accompanying text. See generally Schwartz, supra note 39. 
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probably rise above the $6 minimum dictated by known accident and 
production costs. 
Firm B, in contrast, is unlikely to react to such uncertainties. As 
previously noted, it is already prone, because it lacks the institutional 
attributes of a qualified producer, to evade the $4 in known accident 
costs if doing so increases short-run profits. It is hardly likely to ex-
pend funds on additional research or to insure itself against unforeseen 
liabilities. Correspondingly, because it focuses more on short-run prof-
itability than on long-run survival, it is less likely to decline altogether 
to market the product. 
In sum, risk uncertainty and doctrinal instability - aside from di-
rectly impairing efficiency - exacerbate the problems caused by eva-
sive behavior. Under such conditions, qualified, responsible firms tend 
to regard known accident cost projections as possibly inadequate, and 
therefore behave in a conservative manner that makes their products 
even more costly and noncompetitive. In extreme cases, such produ-
cers may abandon the market altogether, leaving evasion-prone firms 
that are largely indifferent to such contingent concerns to flourish in 
the vacuum. Ironically, in this worst case setting, evasion-prone man-
ufacturers begin to play what might loosely be characterized as a so-
cially useful role. Because of their relative indifference to problems of 
uncertainty, they may continue to produce socially useful products fol-
lowing the retreat of responsible producers. To.be sure, such products 
are unlikely to embody a socially optimal measure of risk - for the 
competitive mechanism generating such optimality has been sus-
pended - but they may still be better, in the social efficiency sense, 
than no products at all. 
III. THE PROSPECTS FOR REFORM 
Thus far, this article has taken the social efficiency justification of 
tort law on its own terms - as a theoretical, empirically unverified, 
and perhaps unverifiable model - and shown how problems of rule 
definition, uncertainty, and liability evasion call into question the 
model's predictions regarding the ability of tort rules and competitive 
product markets to generate socially optimal levels of safety. At this 
juncture, most law review writing reflexively switches from the critical 
to the prescriptive. The shortfalls of existing dogma have been identi-
fied; now, remedies are proposed, agendas are established, crusades are 
announced. 115 Not surprisingly, then, this article's critical thesis -
115. This ritual of criticism followed by reconstruction has been noted elsewhere. See Hen-
derson, supra note 6, at 765. 
1854 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1·820 
that tort law may in fact not be socially efficient - generates an im-
pulse, a desire, to prescribe corrections for this deficiency. 
Indeed, such rallying calls have long been heard from tort reform-
ers. To be sure, they reject the suggestion of the social efficiency 
model that tort rules generate optimal levels of product safety. But 
such reformers, by and large, share the model's implicit normative 
premise. Their language may differ; they may speak of deterrence and 
responsible corporate behavior rather than equilibriums. But their un-
derlying vision - that of a tort system that guides producers toward 
optimal behavior - is the same one that bewitches proponents of the 
social efficiency model. In short, while such reformers dispute that 
tort law is efficient, they agree that it ought to be. And to this end, 
they propose reforms of many stripes and colors, and clamor for 
recruits. 
In my view, enlisting unhesitantly in any such campaign is a mis-
take. This is not to suggest that tort law, in its present configuration, 
is anywhere near ideal. Indeed, in some ways, the current operation of 
the tort system - as a real world phenomenon and not an abstract 
model - seems so inefficient and flawed that almost any change would 
be an improvement. Rather, I wish to suggest that while tort law may 
be improved in a relative, incremental sense, it is probably neither pos-
sible nor wise to devise changes sufficient to produce the social effi-
ciency sought after by tort reformers. 
A. The Possibility of Reform 
This skepticism regarding reform flows from several sources. First, 
comprehensive reform may be very difficult to achieve, particularly if 
such reform is attempted through the tort system itself. The impedi-
ments to social efficiency discussed above are far more impregnable 
than the citadels previously stormed by tort reform. The doctrine of 
privity, for example, was in the end merely a legal construct, and thus 
subject to judicial and legislative abrogation. The problems of rule 
specificity, uncertainty, and evasion are, in contrast, far more endemic 
to a system of regulation based on after-the-fact imposition of 
liability. 116 
As an illustration, it is useful to consider successor liability, the 
area in which tort courts and theorists have been most active recently 
in attempting to control evasive behavior. Essentially, the problem 
arises when a product manufacturer sells its productive assets and dis-
116. See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 718-19 (firms cannot determine efficient behavior if 
liable for remote risk). 
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solves before all of its potential tort liabilities have accrued and been 
satisfied. Because the formal corporate process of dissolution ignores 
contingent future liabilities, 117 tort plaintiffs that are injured after the 
manufacturer has exited the market are generally left without easy 
recourse. 
Such a result obviously conflicts with the social efficiency model of 
tort law, and hence has spurred tort theorists to call for reform 
through expansion of liability rules. 118 The problem lies with the di-
rection such an expansion should take. The obvious villain - the 
manufacturing corporation - no longer exists. The post-dissolution 
plaintiff can sue the former owners of the defunct corporation, 119 but 
enormous practical problems exist. These shareholders may be nu-
merous, dispersed, and hard to identify. Worse yet, because of the 
doctrine oflimited liability, the most the plaintiff can recover from any 
shareholder is the amount the shareholder received upon dissolution 
of the corporation - an amount which in the context of a failed cor-
poration may well be minuscule.120 
Such practical barriers effectively shield the owners of the harm-
causing producer from liability, and thus plaintiffs in such cases have 
naturally looked to the successor corporation - the purchaser of the 
tortfeasor's assets - for satisfaction. Yet when they did so, their ef-
forts were foiled by well-established rules of corporate law that pro-
vided that, absent special circumstances, a purchaser of assets did not 
acquire the unrealized, contingent liabilities of the seller. 121 In re-
sponse to this limitation, several courts have recently fashioned "suc-
cessor liability rules" which impose liability on the successor 
corporation for injuries caused by the predecessor's defective products. 
117. Henn & Alexander, supra note 66, at 898-915. Indeed, most state corporation statutes 
terminate claims arising prior to dissolution if not asserted within two years of dissolution. Id. at 
898-99. Despite the harshness of such limitations from the tort perspective, they serve the goals 
of predictability and certainty favored by business planners. Id. at 911. 
118. See, e.g., Hyman, The Liability of Successor Corporations for Defective Products of a 
Predecessor Corporation - A Switch from Corporate to Tort Law, 10 S.U. L. REV. 165, 203 
(1984) (corporate law's restraints on successor liability represent "Dark Ages" and are "inappro-
priate and irrelevant to modem times"; praises "enlightened courts" that have disregarded cor-
porate rules and "realized that products liability cases should be decided on a products liability 
law basis"). 
119. Such a suit would be based on the theory that shareholders, in receiving their liquida-
tion distributions, hold such moneys in trust for the benefit of future claimants against the dis-
solved corporation. See Henn & Alexander, supra note 66, at 909. 
120. See generally Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect 
Products Liability Claimants. 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 49 (1986). 
121. These rules impose tort liability on the successor only if the assets were transferred 
through a formal or de facto merger or consolidation, if such liabilities were contractually as-
sumed, or if the transaction was marred by certain types of fraud. See Green, supra note 120, at 
22-24; Henn & Alexander, supra note 66, at 888-96. 
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The details of these judicially fashioned successor liability rules 
need not detain us here; 122 rather, what is important to note is the 
limited impact such rules have on the problem of liability evasion. 
The tort rules do nothing to address directly the conduct of the actual 
liability evader - the exiting predecessor. Instead, they seek to con-
trol that conduct indirectly by imposing accident costs on the succes-
sor corporation in the hope that the successor, faced with the 
additional liability costs, will demand appropriate price concessions 
from the predecessor. 123 If such negotiation does occur, the problem 
of evasion is diminished: the tortfeasor may leave the market, but not 
before providing the means to cover its unrealized liabilities.124 
In reality, however, the new successor liability rules probably do 
little to restrain the ability of exiting tortfeasors to limit their liability. 
This is because these new rules themselves are easily subject to eva-
sion. They are nonglobal in nature - imposing liability on the succes-
sor only when it has purchased substantially all the assets and 
goodwill of the predecessor, retained some or all of its employees, and 
continued its product lines. 125 Of course, in the absence of liability 
concerns, this may be the way both the seller and buyer prefer to 
structure the sale of the predecessor's business. But when doing so 
triggers the successor liability rules, and when such liabilities may be 
substantial, both parties may agree to a less efficient transaction in 
order to avoid transfer of the predecessor's unrealized tort liabili-
ties.126 Thus, for example, the predecessor may forego selling, and the 
successor may refuse to buy, the predecessor's goodwill, despite its 
value, if the potential liability costs to be avoided are even greater. 
To be sure, the new judicial handiwork regarding successor liabil-
ity may have its intended deterrent impact in some cases, but only 
122. Somewhat simplified, the expanded rules permit imposition of liability on the successor 
if it substantially continues the product line of the predecessor and purchases substantially all of 
its assets. See generally Green, supra note 120; Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Com· 
ment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984); Phillips, 
Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906 (1983). 
123. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 353-54, 431 A.2d 811, 822 (1981) 
("(T]he true worth of a predecessor corporation must reflect the potential liability that the share-
holders have escaped through the sale of their corporation. Thus, a reduction of the sale price by 
an amount calculated to compensate the successor corporation for the potential liability it has 
assumed is [appropriate]."). 
124. See R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS ll25 (1986), 
125. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d ll45 (ls! Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 
Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). 
126. See Roe, supra note 66, at 31-32: 
[To avoid the new successor liability rules,] the seller usually must shatter some of its own 
operational going concern value .... The factories that made the offending product might 
have to be dismantled and sold off piece by piece, machine by machine; the sales force might 
have to be cut back; and trademarks might have to be destroyed. 
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those in which the economic benefits of engaging in the sort of asset 
transfers covered by the tort rules outweigh the projected costs of as-
suming the predecessor's tort liabilities. These situations are likely to 
be ones where the risks of tort liability from the predecessor's products 
are small and predictable. But where such products may cause mas-
sive or unpredictable injury - a situation which should be of primary 
concern to courts in fashioning tort rules - the nonglobal nature of 
the new rules easily allows the careful corporate planner to protect a 
successor corporation from tort liability for the predecessor's prod-
ucts.127 In such cases, tort law's effort to control the predecessor's 
behavior, through imposition of liability on the successor, is defeated. 
The classic response of tort theorists to such dilemmas has been to 
advocate further expansion of tort rules. 128 Yet for the reasons just 
noted, such efforts are of limited utility. An incremental expansion of 
successor liability rules may capture more transactions, but corporate 
planners will continue to design asset transfers to circumvent the ex-
panded rules when potential liability costs make compliance unprofita-
ble. And even a global rule129 - one that held any purchaser of any 
asset of a exiting producer liable for all that producer's unrealized 
torts - would not necessarily prevent liability evasion. Instead, in 
cases where potential liabilities exceed the value of the predecessor's 
assets, no transfer will take place: the tortfeasor will simply abandon 
the tainted assets and exit the market. This result, in which liabilities 
are evaded and productive assets are wasted, 130 is hardly socially effi-
cient, yet it is likely to plague efforts to control evasive behavior in the 
127. Indeed, the reform impulse of tort law, just as in other areas of law, generates its own 
inevitable counterresponse in the form of practitioner-oriented articles that dispassionately dis-
cuss means of evading the new rules. See, e.g., Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment of 
Seller's Products Liabilities in Assets Acquisitions, 10 U. ToL. L. REv. l (1978); Heitland, Sur-
vival of Products Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 489 (1979); Winthrop, 
Structuring a Corporate Acquisition to Avoid the De Facto Merger Doctrine, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 
(1978); Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Takeover: The Nature and Scope of Successor Corpora-
tion Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 7 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POLY. 185 (1984); Sheeter, 
Acquiring Corporate Assets Without Successor Liability: Is It A Myth?, 1986 CoLUM. Bus. L. 
REV. 137. See also R. GILSON, supra note 124, at 1131-33. 
128. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 39, at 717 (proposing expansion of successor liability 
rules to hold successor liable for all knowable risks, whether or not successor continues predeces-
sor's product line). See generally Prosser, supra note 27 (classic example of the crusade impulse 
common to tort theorists). 
129. In practice, of course, such global rules may be impossible to formulate. Not only do 
they suffer from the fundamental problems of rule specification discussed earlier, see text at notes 
31-36 supra, but they may also be undercut by partial immunization of the actor's conduct by 
other bodies of law, by the actor's ability to operate beyond the territorial reach of the rule, and 
so on. 
130. See Roe, supra note 122, at 1561 (New successor liability rules may result in "stymied 
business transfers, with assets caged in the hands of a demoralized and disabled management that 
is unable to sell its operations to a higher-valuing and perhaps more capable user."). 
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successor liability context.131 
Nor is this defect in the reform impulse limited to the successor 
liability context. The other major area of evasive behavior now subject 
to reform efforts - the use of subsidiaries to cabin liability - presents 
parallel problems. A number of commentators have argued persua-
sively that the concerns underlying the general doctrine of limited lia-
bility do not justify the use of wholly owned subsidiaries to limit a 
parent corporation's liability. Accordingly, they have suggested that 
tort creditors should readily be able to pierce the corporate veil of a 
wholly owned subsidiary in order to reach the assets of the parent in 
the event that tort liability overwhelms the subsidiary.132 
However, adoption by courts of such a veil-piercing rule will not 
redress the problem entirely. Some corporations, whose operations 
generate manageable and predictable levels of risk, may accede to such 
a reform and abandon their use of subsidiaries, at least for purposes of 
liability containment. More risky enterprises, however, may continue 
to use subsidiaries, while attempting to defeat the expanded veil-pierc-
ing rules by sharing ownership of the subsidiary with individual share-
holders, thereby creating a non-wholly owned subsidiary. 133 As with 
the successor liability problem, use of these new subsidiaries would, 
from the parent's perspective, be less efficient than wholly owned sub-
sidiaries, 134 but possibly worthwhile in light of the liability thereby 
avoided. 
Tort courts, of course, could join the chase by expanding rules to 
cover partially owned subsidiaries, but such a change would probably 
require the court to pierce the veil as to the noncorporate shareholders 
as well - a step most courts would be reluctant to take. 135 And even 
if such a bold rule were adopted, corporate planners might simply 
131. In this sense, many tort reform efforts create the sort of problems generally addressed 
under the theory of the second best. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 14, at 1059-65; Rizzo, supra 
note 6, at 652-53. Thus, in the successor liability context, the best solution - forcing all prede-
cessors to pay their liabilities before exiting - is unattainable. The apparent "second best" solu-
tion - holding all successors liable - may in practice turn out to be less efficient than more 
limited rules if it encourages excessive levels of asset abandonment. 
132. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 65, at 611-22; Schwartz, supra note 39, at 717; Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 110-11; Landers, supra note 65, at 619 ("If limited liability 
were being considered for the first time, a strong argument could be made that it should not be 
extended to the corporate parent vis-a-vis its subsidiary."). 
133. See Roe, supra note 66, at 49. 
134. For example, sharing ownership of a subsidiary may preclude the parent from filing a 
consolidated tax return and deducting losses generated by the subsidiary. Similarly, it may 
weaken the parent's control over the actions of the subsidiary, because the subsidiary's directors 
will owe fiduciary obligations to the nonparent shareholders. 
135. See Hackney & Benson, supra note 103, at 873 (noting greater willingness of courts to 
disregard corporate form to reach assets of parent corporation, as opposed to reaching assets of 
individual shareholders). 
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move to the more inefficient, but nonetheless effective, strategy of hav-
ing risky goods produced under contract or license.136 Thus, as with 
successor liability, incremental judicial reforms are likely to be both of 
limited effectiveness and capable of generating serious, collateral 
inefficiencies. 
In sum, tort reform holds limited potential for correcting the 
problems caused by evasive behavior. New rules generate new eva-
sions. And although compliance may increase marginally with each 
expansion of liability rules, such improvements are likely to be offset, 
at least in part, by the decreased efficiency of transactions designed to 
avoid the new rules. Moreover, even with global rules, tort's basic 
mechanism for controlling conduct - the threat of future liability -
is inherently limited. The effectiveness of such a final threat ultimately 
depends on whether the actor has something to lose. But tort law is 
powerless to guarantee that actors will want to, or be able to, stay in 
business. Put more crudely, the law is powerless to ensure that all 
actors make enough money so that they are concerned about the pros-
pect of losing it through liability judgments.137 Thus, even if tort law 
could proscribe all lesser evasions, it can do little to alter the conduct 
of enterprises entering the final, natural refuge of insolvency.138 
Despite the best efforts of tort courts, then, some residuum of 
vagueness, uncertainty, and evasion will remain. This residuum poses 
fundamental problems for the social efficiency model of tort. The 
model relies on competition, and predicts that a responsible producer's 
attention to liability concerns will give it a marginal advantage over 
less responsible actors. But the irreducible residuum of vagueness, un-
certainty, and evasion may diminish, and perhaps completely elimi-
nate, the marginal competitive advantage the tort system bestows on 
the responsible producer. The magnitude of this detrimental impact 
is, of course, an empirical question: tort rules, in practice, may result 
in producer behavior that is largely efficient, somewhat efficient, or 
perhaps not efficient at all. Yet the mere fact that some such shortfall 
136. Id. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 111 (noting that universal abroga-
tion of limited liability in parent-subsidiary context creates perverse incentive for disintegration 
of economic activity). 
137. Cf Coffee, supra note 73, at 390: 
[T]he maximum meaningful fine that can be levied against any corporate offender is neces-
sarily bounded by its wealth .... [T]his wealth boundary seems an absolute limit on the 
reach of deterrent threats directed at it. If the "expected punishment cost" necessary to 
deter a crime crosses this threshold, adequate deterrence cannot be achieved. 
See also Keeton & Kwerel, Externalities in Automobile Insurance and the Uninsured Driver Prob-
lem, 27 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1984) (discussing problems deterring judgment-proof drivers). 
138. Or, as Janis Joplin once sang, "Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose." 
Kristofferson & Foster, Me and Bobby McGee (as performed by Janis Joplin on her Pearl album) 
(Columbia Records, 1971). 
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inevitably occurs calls into question the likelihood of success of a re-
form crusade that has social efficiency as its singular and absolute 
quest. 
B. The Wisdom of Reform 
Moreover, even if tort law could be reformed to achieve a socially 
efficient level of product safety, one might question whether it should 
be. At first blush, this assertion seems heretical, if not insane. How 
can anyone re~sonably question the value of reforms aimed at creating 
a socially optimal level of safety? But that states the issue too nar-
rowly. The question is not whether such a goal is important - for it 
surely is - but whether its attainment through tort reform conflicts 
with other, equally important social agendas. In particular, consider 
the problem of evasive behavior discussed above. Although such con-
duct clearly impairs the social efficiency function of tort, it is impor-
tant to remember that the various forms of such behavior we have 
considered - limited liability, the use of subsidiaries, the discharge of 
obligations in bankruptcy - all represent legislatively sanctioned, per-
fectly legal business strategies. 
Viewed in this light, these forms of evasive behavior suddenly shed 
their nefarious character, and demand respect. They can claim to serve 
a public purpose, yet it is one that lies in apparent conflict with the 
social efficiency goal of tort. For while tort law's central message to 
producers is "Take care, for you shall pay for the harms you cause,'' 
corporate and bankruptcy laws respond: "Take some risks, and in re-
turn, your losses will be limited if things go poorly." While the social 
efficiency model speaks of equilibriums, of optimal decisions, of careful 
weighings of risk and benefit, business law speaks of dynamic change, 
of experimentation, of gambles taken. 139 The ethic of caution con-
fronts the spirit of entreprenuerism. 
I leave for another day the question of whether this doctrinal con-
flict is, in the contemporary lexicon, "fundamental" or instead is 
merely a "tension" ultimately reconcilable on some level of abstrac-
tion. I defer here not because the question is unimportant, but be-
cause, regardless of its outcome, the conflict between the law's 
admonition of caution and its equally strong encouragement of risk-
taking nonetheless poses severe problems for any tort reform agenda. 
For if, on the one hand, the unfettered liability favored by contempo-
rary tort theory is ultimately viewed as plainly inconsistent with basic 
139. Cf Rizzo, supra note 45, at 291 (emphasizing the conflict between the social efficiency 
model's static nature and the "unpredictable flux" of the real world). 
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premises of business law, reforms aimed at improving the social effi-
ciency of tort must ultimately compete in the political arena with con-
cerns that serve contrary ends. If this is the case, the best that tort 
reform may hope to achieve is some sort of sorry stalemate that suits 
neither camp particularly well. 
On the other hand, if the policy concerns underlying tort and busi-
ness law can be squared on some level of analysis, it is one that lies far 
beyond the current dominion of tort theory. Specifically, if efficiency 
is to remain the objective; the scope of inquiry must be vastly ex-
panded. No longer can a reform be justified simply because it elimi-
nates some degree of evasive behavior and thus improves the law's 
policing of product safety. Instead, such benefits must be weighed 
against the costs - in terms of decreased risk-taking, innovation, and 
business formation - that such an inroad into the evasion-sanctioning 
doctrines of business law might entail. 140 
Consider, for example, the recent proposal of a leading tort scholar 
to abolish limited liability, adopt global successor liability rules, and 
preclude discharge of contingent tort claims in bankruptcy so that 
"[c]orporate and bankruptcy law [will] ... function to advance the 
goals that products liability law should serve."141 Assuming for a mo-
ment that such changes would not suffer from the problems of imple-
mentation noted above, the analysis is still painfully incomplete. It 
assumes that the policies underlying corporate and bankruptcy law are 
indifferent to, and unaffected by, such radical changes. Yet it seems 
most implausible that the current configurations of such bodies of law 
are devoid of any special benefits that might be impaired or destroyed 
if corporate and bankruptcy law are conscripted to serve in the cru-
sades of tort. Instead, before one can conclude that such changes ac-
tually improve social welfare, a far more extended calculus must be 
run. The benefits on the tort side of the ledger must not only be tabu-
lated, but also netted against the deficits such changes in corporate 
and bankruptcy law might generate. 142 
140. See, e.g., Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
499 (1976) (negative affects of abolishing limited liability); Schwartz, supra note 39, at 720 (ex-
panding successor liability to cover remote risks would debilitate used asset market); Easterbrook 
& Fischel, supra note 57, at 104 ("The social loss from reducing investment in certain types of 
projects - a consequence of seriously modifying limited liability - might far exceed the gains 
...• "); Roe, supra note 122 (discussing trade-off between expanded successor liability and de-
creased asset transferability). 
141. Schwartz, supra note 39, at 717-18. 
142. Cf Schwartz, Directions in Contemporary Products Liability Scholarship, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 763, 774 (1985) (efficiency explanations for limited liability must be understood before 
accepting Schwartz's proposal, note 141 supra and accompanying text, to abolish doctrine to 
further tort reform). 
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Thus, for example, a comprehensive, efficiency-oriented analysis of 
such reforms must determine to what extent altering the doctrine of 
limited liability will depress capital formation, inhibit the liquidity of 
the equity markets, contract the base of business ownership, and in-
crease the costs of monitoring management. 143 It must ask whether 
expanding the successor liability rules will generate unacceptable 
levels of asset abandonment and encourage inefficient, rule-evading 
transfers. 144 And such an analysis must decide whether closing the 
sanctuary of bankruptcy reorganization to tortfeasors will preclude 
the rehabilitation of potentially viable businesses and shunt such ac-
tors into the relatively lawless process of self-liquidation. 145 
These are the sorts of inquiries that must be pursued, and the re-
sults of which must be quantified, before one can really talk sensibly 
about the efficiency-enhancing effects of proposed reforms. Yet, the 
sheer magnitude of the task is bewildering, if not impossible. 146 And 
even if it is theoretically possible to reconstruct the notion of social 
efficiency in such an abstract and comprehensive fashion, can there be 
any realistic faith in the ability of contemporary lawmaking institu-
tions to create rules that in practice come close to striking such a 
global balance? The available candidates are the courts and the legis-
latures, the very parties that started the fight. Others have argued that 
both institutions are, by their very nature, incapable of playing the role 
of Solomon, 147 yet that would seem to be what is required. 148 
Alternatively, one might put aside the effort to retrofit social effi-
ciency onto tort law, and instead choose to view it from alternative, 
143. See text at note 59 supra. 
144. See text at notes 128-31 supra. 
145. See Roe, supra note 67. 
146. Cf Rizzo, supra note 6, at 642 ("While in principle all of the spillover effects of alterna-
tive legal rules might be totalled and the socially value-maximizing set of rules specified, the 
information requirements for such an achievement are well beyond the capacity of the courts or 
anyone else.") (footnote omitted). 
147. A number of critics have argued that the tort system is incapable of resolving such 
complex, multi-faceted conflicts. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious 
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1971) (discussing limited 
competence and perspective of courts in complex products liability cases); Huber, supra note 43 
(same). Others have questioned the capacity of the legislative and regulatory processes to make 
socially optimal decisions free from undue influence by special interest groups. See, e.g., Stigler, 
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Becker, A Theory 
of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Noll, 
The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy, 139 J. !NSTL. & THEORETICAL ECON. 377 (1983); 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976). See gener· 
ally Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987). 
148. See Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 
(1984) (an illuminating discussion of the comparative efficacy of tort rules and direct regulation 
in varying contexts). 
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overtly noneconomic perspectives. 149 Thus, the tort system might be 
more productively analyzed as a judicial mechanism for prodding leg-
islative action, 150 or as a tribal device for articulating fears, prejudices, 
and values, 151 or perhaps simply as Robin Hood writ large.152 Such 
perspectives lack the cleanliness and precision of the social efficiency 
model of tort, but they may fall closer to the mark. 
CONCLUSION 
The social efficiency model of tort is a t:Q.eory many of us want to 
believe. It warms and assures us with the idea that the world makes 
sense, that order lurks beneath the surface chaos of accidents and inju-
ries. Yet, on critical examination, the model's patina of rigor appears 
somewhat tarnished. The difficulty lies not with its internal logic, but 
with the rigid assumptions necessary to bring it to life. Once these 
assumptions are relaxed to better reflect real world constraints, the 
model's conception of tort law as a system of effective incentives to-
ward optimal producer behavior becomes questionable. 
Internally, tort law's need for predictability clashes with its depen-
dence on inevitability. And its inadequate response to the problems of 
uncertainty generated by remote risks and doctrinal shifts makes it 
difficult for even the most attentive producer to follow its directives. 
Externally, tort law's promotion of caution confronts the unruly ter-
rain of business law, where an entirely different, and partly hostile, 
ethic prevails. The discipline tort law hopes to impose on all produ-
cers is undercut as some, either because they care less about the conse-
quences of disobedience or because they are tom by internal conflict, 
break ranks and shirk their liabilities. 
Whether, in light of the above, tort law can achieve social effi-
149. Cf. Rizzo, supra note 6, at 642 ("[I)f we cannot determine with any reasonable degree of 
accuracy when an overall efficiency improvement has occurred, the normative attractiveness of 
that goal must be thrown into serious doubt."). 
150. See generally Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986). 
151. Huber, for example, attacks the tort system precisely because, in his view, it systemati-
cally fails to address significant "private" risks, while fixating on less dangerous "public" risks. 
Huber, supra note 43, at 279-90. Implicit in his argument is the notion that any good society 
should necessarily rank risks purely according to their quantitative potential for harm, and 
devote its energies to minimizing such harms. Yet, even the most modern of societies often 
demonstrate "irrational" patterns of risk preference, ignoring some major threats while lavishing 
vast resources on what - from a purely quantitative perspective - are relatively minor dangers. 
See generally M. DOUGLAS & A. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN EsSAY ON THE SELEC-
TION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS {1982). In this regard, attacks such as Hu-
ber's against the tort system are of limited utility; the task is not merely to bemoan the 
irrationality of society's risk preferences, but to understand why - in a system where both legis-
lative and judicial change is possible - such preferences nonetheless exist. 
152. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 43, at 319. 
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ciency becomes a very difficult question to answer, particularly in an 
abstract and universal way. The truth, if it can be known, may be that 
tort rules are only capable of forcing manufacturers to behave some-
what efficiently, some of the time, under some conditions. For some, 
this may be enough. For others, however, the shortcomings of tort 
law seem to demand reform. 
Yet here, the article suggests, a new set of frustrations arise. As 
reform crusades venture beyond the perimeter of tort law into the 
broader legal environment, they confront the ever changing strata-
gems and guerilla tactics of business planners. Some areas may be 
pacified, but in others, resistance continues. Some producers may ac-
quiesce in the new regime, but others escape to the border sanctuaries 
of corporate and business law. Nor is it simply a matter of adopting 
proper tactics, for on a more fundamental level, the generals of tort 
reform face a bitter struggle for the hearts and minds of the populace. 
They offer safety and responsibility; their opponents speak of bold 
gambles and freedom. Both anthems have strong appeal, and hence 
the prospect of a final, decisive victory remains dim. 
Thus, the central themes of this article - that tort law does not 
necessarily push producers towards a socially efficient level of product 
safety, that reform efforts are doomed to partial failure, and that even 
attempting such reforms is risky business - probably strike most as 
depressing. This is hardly surprising; the social efficiency vision is nar-
cotic in its effect, and its rejection is therefore not without cost. But 
recognizing the limits of the model does not require rejecting efficiency 
as a value, economic analysis as a tool, or tort reform as a goal. 
Rather, it simply means accepting the complexity of the world and its 
mischievous resistance to single-minded pursuits. 
